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1 Outlook and appraisal 
Brian Ashcroft, Economics Editor, Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
Overview 
 
Output and jobs growth in the Scottish economy has weakened since we last reported in March 2016. 
After GDP data revisions it is now clear that with growth of only 0.1% in the second quarter last year and 
then a fall of -0.1% in the third quarter, the Scottish economy came perilously close to a recession in 
2015 and despite the slight upturn to 0.2%; growth in the fourth quarter may fail to avoid a recession in 
the coming months. In the fourth quarter, Scotland had to rely solely on the service sector for growth as 
the contribution of construction faded away to zero with the stimulus from infrastructure spending 
disappearing. Slight negative growth in the production sector meant that the recession in the sector 
continued with negative growth having occurred in three successive quarters. Within production, 
manufacturing technically emerged from recession with fourth quarter growth of 0.3% after experiencing 
falling output in the previous two quarters. But despite that, manufacturing growth in Scotland can only 
be described as weak. Moreover, even though services registered growth of 0.3% in the final quarter of 
last year, UK services grew three times faster and performance in all principal private subsectors in 
Scotland is appreciably weaker than their UK counterparts. Financial services are especially weak and 
the weakness of business services growth has been exacerbated by the effects of the fall in the price of 
oil. 
 
The latest labour market data revealed a significant deterioration in performance as the job shedding 
associated with the consequences of the oil price fall and deteriorating export performance began to 
bite. In the quarter to March 2016 the numbers in work fell by 53,000 (-2.0%) to 2,578,000. The last time 
there was a fall in jobs of this scale was back in early 2010. Unemployment rose by 8,000 (+4.8%) to 
169,000 with the rate rising to 6.2%, compared to 5.1% in the UK, a gap that is now the largest since 
mid-2004. Over the year, Scottish jobs fell by -45,000, a fall of -1.7%. Unemployment in Scotland rose 
by 2,000 over the year, or by 1%. The numbers inactive rose in Scotland in the quarter by 49,000 or by 
3.1%, while over the year, inactive numbers rose by 59,000 (3.7%) in Scotland. As a result of this 
downturn in the labour market, by the end of the first three months of this year the gap between 
Scotland’s and the UK’s employment performance had widened considerably with Scottish jobs as 
reported in the LFS household surveys 0.9% above their pre-recession peak, compared to UK jobs 
which were 6.3% above peak. 
 
Looking forward, what seems to be happening is that both domestic and overseas demand for Scottish 
goods and services are faltering, while a weakened domestic demand is still driving growth in Scotland. 
It now seems clear that both investment and household spending have been badly affected by the 
continuation of the low price of oil, with job losses affecting household incomes and spending and fixed 
investment affected by the decline in onshore investment in the oil service industry and related activities 
as well as the slowdown in infrastructure spending and construction activity. Another factor to note is 
that the household saving ratio in Scotland was 6.3% in 2015q4 31% lower than it was in the 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 40(1)  Scottish economy 
 
June 2016            4 
corresponding quarter of 2014. This fall will clearly have helped sustain household spending either by 
households saving less or borrowing more. However, a close look at the data reveals that the ratio fell 
from 9.1% to 6.8% between 2014q4 and 2015q1, then fell a little further to 6.3% in the second quarter 
and essentially remained there for the rest of the year. By the end of the year the effect of the fall in the 
saving ratio was fading away as households possibly started to rein back their borrowing and spending. 
In addition, wage growth remains weak while the housing market seems to be weakening, which is also 
likely to have a detrimental effect on household spending.  It might also be the case that uncertainty 
about the outcome of the BREXIT referendum on 23rd June might be encouraging companies to 
postpone investment plans until the issue about Britain’s economic relationship with the EU is clarified. 
In this context it is worth noting that net trade has made a negative contribution to Scotland’s GDP 
growth in 4 of the last 5 quarters, while Scottish exports (including trade with rest of UK) in current 
market prices have actually been falling since 2014 and Scottish manufacturing exports to the rest of the 
world fell in real terms in the second half of last year. 
 
So, we must conclude that household demand and fixed investment will continue to drive growth in 
Scotland but with the stimulus from household spending and fixed investment weakening while net trade 
continues to have a negative effect as the rate of growth in Scotland’s main export markets is predicted 
to fall. In addition, the continuation of the UK Government’s austerity programme means that there is 
little hope of a compensating boost to growth from this component of demand. 
 
Against this background we have revised down our GDP (output) forecast for this year from 1.9% in 
March 2016 to 1.4%. This downward revision is driven by slow investment growth, the continuing effects 
of the fall in the price of oil on household incomes and spending, a general slowing in household 
spending as the rate of household borrowing diminishes and a worsening demand for Scottish exports 
as global growth and growth in Scotland’s key export markets slows. We are forecasting growth of 1.9% 
in 2017 a downward revision to our March forecast of 2.2%, due to an anticipated weakening of both 
domestic and export demand for goods and services produced in Scotland compared to our March 
forecast. We are now forecasting 2018 and our prediction is that there will be growth of 2.0% as the 
economy returns to trend. 
 
We have revised down our forecasts of employee jobs because of the deteriorating conditions in the 
Scottish labour market. The number of total employee jobs is still forecast to increase in each year with 
the number of jobs at the end of 2016 forecast to be 2,445,650, an increase of 1.2% during 2016. Our 
new central forecast is that the Scottish economy will add 28,650 jobs in 2016, down by around 8,000 
from our March forecast, with a net of 39,450 jobs added in 2017, down by more than 7,000 from our 
March forecast. Jobs growth in 2018 is forecast to be 47,379. On unemployment, the deterioration in 
many labour market indicators over the last four months, and the revision downwards of growth 
performance of Scotland in 2016 cause us to revise up our forecasts for unemployment in both levels 
and rates. Our latest forecasts for the unemployment rate in Scotland for the end of 2016 is now 6.9%, 
with our forecast for this to fall to 6.7% and then 6.2% by the end of 2017 and 2018, respectively. 
 
Finally, in this section of the Commentary we consider further the challenges facing the Scottish 
economy and turn to the question of policies to promote long-term growth. We note that the Scotland’s 
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Economic Strategy published by the Scottish Government in March of last year is the latest of many 
growth strategies produced by Scottish governments since devolution. All of these strategies provide a 
strategic framework grounded in mainstream economic development theory, which essentially see 
economic growth as the consequence of productivity growth stimulated through the promotion of specific 
‘supply-side’ change: improvements in innovation and R&D, enterprise, investment, competition, and 
skills. But all of these strategies, including the current one, were stronger on the ‘what’ of growth 
promotion with much less emphasis on the ‘how’. In other words, there needs to be more thought and 
debate on the operationalisation and implementation of the promotion of innovation, enterprise, 
investment and skills formation in Scotland. It is not new strategies the Scottish economy needs but 
clear insights and policy action on the implementation of Scotland’s Economic Strategy. In view of this, 
we welcome the recent creation of the new Economy Secretary post in the Scottish Government and 
particularly welcome the new Cabinet Secretary Keith Brown’s early initiative in instituting a review of 
Scotland’s enterprise and skills agencies. If this review is undertaken in a positive way to help enhance 
the operational impact of the agencies, it could mark the beginning of a process where strategy 
implementation moves centre stage in economic policy in Scotland. 
The Fraser of Allander Institute also welcomes the appointment of the new Cabinet Secretary for 
Finance, Derek Mackay MSP. The Scottish Parliament’s new fiscal powers give the Scottish budget a 
greater fiscal and economic importance. To reflect this, the Fraser of Allander Institute is initiating a new, 
annual event - “Scotland’s Budget” - to provide informed and independent economic and fiscal analysis 
of the opportunities and consequences of Scotland’s new fiscal freedoms. To coincide with the event - 
be held in Edinburgh in September 2016 - the Fraser will publish a special ‘Scottish Budget’ edition of 
the Economic Commentary that will provide: an outlook for Scottish economy; an overview of the UK 
public finances and the implications for Scotland; an outline of Scotland’s new fiscal framework; the 
outlook for the Scottish Budget; and, the choices facing the Cabinet Secretary and the likely impacts of 
alternative policy responses. 
Recent GDP performance 
 
The latest Scottish GDP data are for the fourth quarter of last year (2015q4). The chained volume 
measure of GDP rose by 0.2% in Scotland in the quarter, while UK GDP rose by 0.6%. Over the year – 
four quarters on four quarters – Scottish growth was weaker than UK growth at 1.9% compared to 2.3%. 
However, the marked weakening of Scottish growth from the second quarter of last year means that the 
growth between the fourth quarter of 2015 and the fourth quarter of 2014 of 0.9% is, in present 
circumstances, a better indication of annual Scottish growth compared to the UK where growth was 
2.1%. It is also worth noting that Scottish GDP growth in the third quarter of last year was revised 
downwards in the latest release to a fall of -0.1% compared to a rise of +0.1% on the earlier data. It is 
now clear with growth of only 0.1% in the second quarter the Scottish economy came perilously close to 
a recession in the second and third quarters of last year and despite the upturn in the figures for the 
fourth quarter may yet not escape a recession in the coming months. The Scottish and UK quarterly 
growth rates back to 2007q1 are presented in Figure 1.  
 
With the revised data, the Scottish economy in the third quarter ceased to enjoy the positive growth that 
it had experienced for the previous 10 quarters (since 2012q3). The widening of the gap between 
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Scottish and UK GDP growth in recent quarters has meant that the UK recovery from the Great 
Recession has strengthened farther relative to Scotland as is shown in Figure 2a. 
 
By the fourth quarter, Scottish GDP was 3.1% above the pre-recession peak while UK GDP was 6.8% 
above its peak. Growth from the trough of the recession to the fourth quarter last year amounts to 8.5% 
in Scotland and 13.9% in the UK. 
 
Figure 1: Scottish and UK Quarterly GDP Growth, 2007q1 - 2015q4 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2015, and (FAI) calculations 
 
 
Figure 2a: GDP, Scotland and UK: in recession and recovery to 2015q4 (relative to pre-recession peak)  
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2015, and FAI calculations 
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As noted in previous Commentaries, Scottish Government statisticians are now producing GDP per 
head data, which in many ways is a better measure of the prosperity of people in Scotland. In addition, 
recent years have seen high inward migration into the UK and Scotland, so in assessing the 
performance of the economy of over time we really need to control for changing population. Data for 
recession and recovery in GDP per head in Scotland and the UK are presented in Figure 2b. 
 
 
Figure 2b: GDP per head, Scotland and UK: in recession and recovery to 2015q4 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2015, and FAI calculations 
 
 
Figure 3: GDP (ex oil & gas), Scotland and UK: in recession and recovery to 2015q4 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2015, and FAI calculations 
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In the fourth quarter UK GDP per head stood at +1.0% above its pre-recession peak, whereas in 
Scotland GDP per head was -0.2% below pre-recession peak. Clearly, the relative weakening of 
Scottish economic growth is now affecting GDP per head with the gap between the UK and Scotland 
widening (1.2% points) compared to the previous quarter (0.5% points). 
 
Returning to the overall GDP data we now allow for the complicating factor of oil and gas production, 
which for offshore production is included in the UK GDP data but not in the Scottish data. Removing oil 
and gas production from UK GDP data gives us Figure 3. 
 
When oil and gas production is removed, we find again that the gap in the strength of the recovery 
widens further in the UK’s favour. UK GDP (ex oil & gas) stands 7.9% above the pre-recession peak 
compared to 3.1% in Scotland. The long period of weak UKCS oil and gas production has slowed the 
recovery of UK GDP from recession. So, UK GDP - ex oil & gas - has had an even stronger recovery 
from recession than Scottish GDP. Scottish GDP has recovered by 8.5% since the trough of recession 
while UK GDP - ex oil & gas – has recovered by 14.8% from its trough by 2015q4, compared to 13.9% 
when oil and gas output is included. In the latest quarter, UK GDP ex oil and gas rose by 0.65% - a little 
faster than the 0.56% reported when oil & gas is included - and by 2.2% over the year, four quarters on 
four quarters. 
Sectoral Components of GVA growth 
Turning now to individual sectors of the economy, we see a continuation of the convergence in the 
pattern of growth between Scotland and the UK, which we highlighted in the previous Commentary. In 
the UK, the service sector was again by far the main driver of the overall growth rate of 0.6% by 
contributing growth of +0.7% points. In Scotland the service sector was also the main driver of growth 
contributing +0.2% points to overall growth of 0.2%. The construction sector, which was the main driver 
of Scottish growth in the second quarter and contributed slightly by only +0.1% in the third quarter, had a 
zero contribution to growth in the fourth quarter as in the UK. The production sector made a very slight 
negative contribution to growth in Scotland in the fourth quarter while making a small negative 
contribution of -0.1% in the UK. Within production, manufacturing in both Scotland and the UK made an 
insignificant contribution to growth. In Scotland mining & quarrying made a negative contribution to 
growth of -0.1% points, with the other production sub-sectors neither providing a positive or negative 
contribution to Scottish growth. The production sub-sectors in the UK all made a zero contribution to 
growth.  These data continue to offer evidence of the continuing reliance of both the UK and Scottish 
economies on service sector growth and the failure to rebalance in favour of manufacturing which was 
the express desire of the UK Government. 
Service sector  
 
The Scottish service sector, which on 2012 weights accounts for 75% of GDP in Scotland and 78% in 
the UK, grew by 0.3% in Scotland in the fourth quarter and produced 0.9% growth over the year – four 
quarters on four quarters. In contrast, UK services grew by almost three times as fast as services in 
Scotland with growth of 0.8% in the quarter and 2.7% over the year -- see Figure 4.  
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Figure 4: Scottish and UK Services GVA Growth 2007q1 to 2015q4  
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2015, and FAI calculations 
 
Figure 5: Services GVA, Scotland and UK: in recession and recovery to 2015q4 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2015 and FAI calculations 
 
The state of the recovery in Scottish and UK services is presented in Figure 5. After experiencing a 
shallower but more drawn out recession in Scotland of -3.3% compared to -4.2% in the UK, output in the 
sector stood at 3.5% above its pre-recession peak by the fourth quarter of last year very significantly 
less than the 11.9% above peak achieved in the UK. 
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So, continuing weaker service sector growth in the fourth quarter in Scotland meant that the gap 
between the scale of the recoveries widened further in favour of the UK to +8.4% points. As noted in the 
previous Commentary, the effect of the slowdown in the oil & gas industry due to the low price of oil is 
affecting business services and the service sector as a whole in Scotland much more than the UK, 
because of the concentration of the oil-services supply chain in Scotland. However, the weakness of 
Scottish services is also more general and due to other reasons since UK services have now grown 
faster than Scottish services for the past eight quarters. 
 
Production / Manufacturing sector 
 
The production sector has been the key driver of Scotland’s recovery. However, since the first quarter of 
2015 it slipped into recession and during the final three months of last year output was still falling. Even 
so production overall has grown by 8.5% since the trough of the recession equal to the 8.6% achieved 
by the economy as a whole. This contrasts with the growth of 6.2% in the Scottish service sector since 
the trough of the recession. In the UK, the production sector remains a drag on the recovery with growth 
of 2.0% since the trough of the recession compared to the 13.9% growth of overall GDP and 14.8% for 
GDP ex oil & gas. Scottish production output fell in the fourth quarter by -0.1% while UK production 
contracted even more by -0.4%. Over the year - four quarters on four quarters – Scottish production 
GVA fell by -0.2%, while UK production output rose by 1.0%. 
 
Figure 6: Manufacturing GVA, Scotland and UK: growth at constant basic prices 2007q1 to 2015q4  
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2015, and FAI calculations 
Within production, Mining & quarrying GVA contracted by -2.3% in the fourth quarter and contracted by -
1.3% over the year (UK mining & quarrying contracted by -2.2% and grew by 6.9%, respectively). 
Electricity & gas supply GVA contracted by -0.8% in the fourth quarter but rose by 1.5% over the year 
(UK electricity & gas supply contracted by -2.2% and by -0.2%, respectively). In the fourth quarter, GVA 
in Scottish manufacturing rose by 0.3% but fell by -1.1% over the year, while UK manufacturing output 
rose by 0.1% in the quarter but falling by -0.3% over the year. Figure 6 charts the quarterly percentage 
changes in GVA in Scottish and UK manufacturing.  
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Figure 6 makes clear that Scottish manufacturing was subject to a brief recession during the second and 
third quarters of last year emerging in the fourth quarter with a small degree of positive growth. UK 
manufacturing was subject to a less severe recession over the first three quarters of last year with 
growth effectively stagnating in the fourth quarter.  
Figure 7 shows the impact of the latest data on the manufacturing sector's recovery from recession. 
 
Figure 7: Manufacturing GVA, Scotland and UK: in recession and recovery to 2015q4  
 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2015, and FAI calculations 
By the fourth quarter of last year Scottish manufacturing GVA was -7.6% below its pre-recession peak, 
compared to -6.5% for manufacturing in the UK. Manufacturing growth in both Scotland and the UK is 
now clearly weak after picking up in 2013 and 2014. As we noted in the previous Commentary, it is a 
matter of deep concern that the level of manufacturing output in both Scotland and the UK as a whole is 
lower than the level it was at in the third quarter of 2010. In Scotland, the level of manufacturing output 
was 2% lower in the final three months of last year than it was in the third quarter 2010. 
Within manufacturing, only three of the seven principal sectors experienced growth in the third quarter: 
refined petroleum, chemical & pharmaceutical products (accounting for 13% of manufacturing GVA) 
grew by 5.3% in the quarter and by 4.1% over the year; food & drink (accounting for 27% of 
manufacturing GVA) grew by 1.6% in the quarter and by 4.4% over the year; and transport equipment 
(accounting for 7% of manufacturing GVA) grew by 1.0% in the quarter and by 2,5% over the year. 
However, that growth performance was offset by the four manufacturing sub-sectors that contracted in 
the quarter: computer, electrical and optical products (electronics) (accounting for 10% of manufacturing 
GVA), contracted by 4.0% in the quarter and by -0.3% over the year; metals, metal products & 
machinery n.e.c. (accounting for 17% of manufacturing GVA) contracted by -1.5% in the quarter and by -
13.9% over the year; textiles, clothing & leather products (accounting for 4% of manufacturing GVA) 
contracted by 1.2% in the quarter and by -1.8% over the year; and other manufacturing industries, repair 
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& installation (accounting for 24% of manufacturing GVA) contracted by -1.0% in the quarter and by -
2.2% over the year. 
Construction sector 
Turning now to construction, the latest data are presented in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8: Scottish & UK Construction GVA: volume growth 2007q1 - 2015q4 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2015, and FAI calculations 
 
 
Figure 9: Construction, Scotland and UK: in recession and recovery to 2015q4  
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2015, and FAI calculations 
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Scottish construction GVA was almost stagnant in the final quarter of last year with growth of only 0.1%. 
The major boost to construction provide by public infrastructure projects in Scotland appears now to 
have dissipated. Over the year the sector still grew by a remarkable 19.5% but the sector has clearly 
now entered a new weaker phase. The UK construction sector grew by 0.3% in the fourth quarter and by 
3.4% over the year. Figure 9 shows the recession and recovery performance of both the Scottish and 
UK construction sectors. 
 
Figure 9 shows the public infrastructure driven surge in Scottish construction activity from the final 
quarter of 2013 and then flattens out after the second quarter of last year as that surge came to an end. 
The chart shows that by the 2015q4 Scottish construction had moved to 16.7% above its pre-recession 
peak compared to UK construction, which was -3.5% below its pre-recession level. 
 
Within services, two of the three principal sub-sectors in the private sector posted positive growth in the 
fourth quarter: business and financial services and distribution, hotels and catering. Business and 
financial services grew slightly by 0.3% in the quarter and grew by 1.0% over the year, compared 
respectively, to growth of 0.7% and 2.7% in the UK. Figure 10 shows the growth of the sector in 
Scotland and UK during the recession and recovery. 
 
Components of private services sector growth 
 
Figure 10: Business & Financial Services, Scotland and UK: in recession and recovery to 2015q4 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2015, and FAI calculations 
 
By the fourth quarter, business and financial services output or GVA remained +7.3% above its pre-
recession peak in Scotland compared to +15.1% in the UK. The sector in Scotland continues to lag its 
UK counterpart and the effect of the low oil price on activity in oil and gas support firms, which are 
classified to business services may have contributed to a widening of the gap between the performance 
of the sector in Scotland and the UK. The aggregate GVA data for business and financial services in 
86.00
93.00
100.00
107.00
114.00
121.00
Scotland UK
-5.6% 
-4.8% 
+7.3%  
+15.1% 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 40(1)  Scottish economy 
 
June 2016            14 
Scotland have recently masked significant weakness in the performance of financial services. Figure 11 
shows what has been happening to financial services since peak output in the second quarter of 2008. 
 
Figure 11: Financial Services in Scotland: in recession and recovery 2007q2 to 2015q4 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2015, and FAI calculations 
 
After growth of 1.4% in the fourth quarter last year GVA in the sector was -13.0% below the pre-
recession peak compared to the trough of -15.5% in 2012q4. Despite the recent pick up in performance 
the value of output fell by -2.6% over the year and it seems unlikely that the scale of the financial 
services sector in Scotland will return to the levels seen before the Great Recession in the foreseeable 
future. 
 
Figure 12: Transport, Storage & Communication, Scotland and UK: in recession & recovery to 2015q4 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2015, and FAI calculations 
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The second of the two principal sub-sectors in private services displaying positive growth in the fourth 
quarter was transport, storage & communication, which grew by 1.5% in Scotland and by 1.2% in the 
UK. Over the year, growth was 0.3% in Scotland and 4.3% in the UK. Figure 12 indicates that the 
recession was deeper and more prolonged in the Scottish sector with output falling by -15.3% compared 
to   -8.9% in the UK. Thereafter, the Scottish sector has largely stagnated but that has not been the case 
in the UK. By the end of the fourth quarter GVA in the Scottish sector was -10.2% below its pre-
recession peak compared to +10.5% above in the UK, a huge difference in the performance of the 
sector between Scotland and the UK. 
 
The other principal sub-sector in private services is distribution, hotels and catering (accounting for 18% 
of services sector output in Scotland), which covers the Scottish high street, accommodation and 
restaurants and captures some of the impact of tourism.  The sector exhibited falling output in the fourth 
quarter. GVA fell slightly by -0.3% in the quarter but rose by 1.8% over the year. In the UK, the sector 
grew by 1.4% in the quarter and by 4.7% over the year. Figure 13 shows the performance of the sector 
during recession and recovery. 
 
Figure 13: Distribution, Hotels & Catering, Scotland and UK: in recession and recovery to 2015q4  
 
 
 Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2015, and FAI calculations 
 
Figure 13 reveals that by the fourth quarter the sector in the UK was +11.1% above its peak, while the 
sector in Scotland continued to do much worse at only +4.1% above peak. The scale of the recession in 
the sector in Scotland at -5.3% was much less than the loss of output in the sector in the UK, which 
amounted to -9.4%. The track of the recovery in the sector picked up in the UK from 2012q4 but 
continued at much the same slow pace in Scotland, with the level of GVA in the sector in the UK relative 
to the pre-recession peak overtaking Scotland in the final three months of 2013. 
 
Finally, output in Government & Other Services in Scotland in the fourth quarter rose by 0.3% compared 
to a rise of 0.4% the UK. Over the year, output in the public sector grew by 0.5% in Scotland and by 
0.7% in the UK. Figure 14 shows the performance of GVA in the sector in recession and recovery. 
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Figure 14: Government & Other Services, Scotland and UK: in recession and recovery to 2015q4  
 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 3rd QUARTER 2015, and FAI calculations 
 
By the fourth quarter GVA in the sector in the UK was 8.1% above the pre-recession peak, which, as 
noted many times in previous Commentaries, is difficult to understand at a time of fiscal consolidation, 
whereas output in the sector in Scotland was 1.5% above its pre-recession peak.  
 
The Labour Market 
 
The latest labour market data for January - March 2016 (see Scottish Labour Market section below) 
reveals a significant deterioration in labour market performance. In the quarter to March 2016 
employment fell by 53,000 (-2.0%) to 2,578,000. The last time there was a fall in jobs of this scale was 
back in early 2010. Unemployment rose by 8,000 (+4.8%) to 169,000 with the rate rising to 6.2%. In the 
UK, employment rose weakly, with 44,000 jobs created or an increase of 0.14%, while unemployment 
again fell but slightly by -2,000 (-0.13%) with the rate remaining unchanged at 5.1%. The gap between 
the Scottish and UK unemployment rate is now at its largest since mid-2004. Over the year, Scottish 
jobs fell by -45,000, a fall of -1.7%, while UK jobs rose 409,000, or 1.3%. Unemployment in Scotland 
rose by 2,000 over the year, or 1%, while in the UK unemployment continued to fall by -139,000, or -
7.6%. The numbers inactive rose in Scotland in the quarter by 49,000 or 3.1%, compared to an identical 
rise of 49,000 in the UK or 0.3%. Over the year, inactive numbers rose by 59,000 (3.7%) in Scotland and 
by 109,000, or 0.6% in the UK. 
 
Figure 15 shows the performance of employment in Scotland and the UK during recession and recovery 
to the first quarter of this year i.e. 2016q1.  
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Figure 15: Total Employment: Scotland and UK: pre-recession peak to 2016q1 
 
 
 Source, ONS Regional Labour Statistics and FAI calculations 
 
After the large loss of jobs in the latest quarter, Scottish jobs as reported in the LFS household surveys 
were 0.9% above the pre-recession peak, while UK jobs were 6.3% above peak. The shake out in jobs 
in Scotland is clearly related to the consequences of the fall in the price of oil. But the fall is likely only to 
be partly due to the effects of the falling oil price. The continued weakness of manufacturing is likely also 
to be important. Whatever the causes, the gap between the UK and Scotland is at its widest since early 
2010 for unemployment and early 2012 for employment. 
 
Challenges facing the Scottish economy 
 
In the previous three Commentaries (Vol. 39, No’s 1, 2 and 3) we began to consider the challenges 
facing the Scottish economy. The July 2015 Commentary (Vol. 39, No. 1) focused on the short-term 
capacity utilisation issue. In the November 2015 Commentary (Vol. 39, No. 2) we focused on the more 
long-term capacity growth question. In the March 2016 Commentary (Vol, 39, No.3) we examined the 
revised data on Scotland’s long-term growth performance, and considered the implications for 
Scotland’s economic performance if the British people voted to leave the European Union in the coming 
referendum on 23 June 2016. 
 
We concluded that the latest revised data suggested that Scotland’s growth performance over the long-
run had been weaker than the UK with GDP per head growth evened out by falling and/or slower 
population growth in Scotland, with some of that weaker population growth reflecting the weaker relative 
strength of the Sottish economy. On productivity, the key overall driver of growth, we concluded that 
while Scottish labour productivity was growing, it was weaker than in the UK: -2.4% below. Moreover, we 
noted that academic research on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) - where one estimates the productivity 
of all factors: labour, capital and land – has found it to be significantly lower in Scotland than in the UK. 
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In one key study, the ‘gap’ between Scotland and rest of UK was around 11% across all sectors in 2012 
(and 22% below the leading UK region). We suggested that the evidence indicated that Scotland was 
weak in varying degrees on all of the key determinants of competitiveness: in innovation/R&D; exporting 
(especially for a small open economy); skills; investment, and enterprise.  
 
On BREXIT, we concluded that there was a high probability that output and growth in the Scottish 
economy would be damaged if Britain left the EU. First, the likelihood would be that trading 
arrangements would be less favourable than in the EU. Not only would actual and potential Scottish 
exporters have to overcome their weaker competitive position due to lower labour and total factor 
productivity they would also have to face the additional hurdle of less favourable trading arrangements. 
Secondly, Brexit might worsen Scottish productivity growth through the negative effects on trade 
competition, inward investment and financial integration. So, at a time when there is increasing policy 
concern about Scotland’s productivity and growth performance a vote to leave the EU would place an 
unnecessary burden on Scottish companies and economic policy. 
 
In the current Commentary we offer a few comments on policy issues relating to the improvement of 
Scotland’s long-term growth perfromance. 
 
Policy and the Growth of the Scottish Economy 
 
The achievement of legislative devolution in 1999 following the Scotland Act 1998 allowed Scottish 
Governments to develop a strategic approach to the promotion of Scotland’s economic development. 
The process began with the introduction of the Framework for Economic Development  in June 2000. 
This was followed by the publication of Smart Successful Scotland, with its focus on the role of the 
Enterprise Networks, in February 2001. Both FEDS and SSS were “refreshed” in 2004, and 2005 with 
largely cosmetic changes. After the SNP Government came to power in 2007 a Government Economic 
Strategy was published in November 2007. In September 2011 a new strategy was published and 
finally, in March 2015 the Scottish Government published Scotland’s Economic Strategy. 
 
All of these strategies provide a strategic framework grounded in mainstream economic development 
theory, which sees economic growth being enhanced by productivity growth through the promotion of 
‘supply-side’ change. Supply-side improvements in innovation and R&D, enterprise, investment, 
competition, and skills are the route to faster economic growth. It is true that the strategies have focused 
on other things seen as important to the development of the economy. So, for example the 2011 
strategy introduced the desire to move to a low-carbon economy as a strategic priority, while the latest 
strategy has introduced the priority of tackling inequality and promoting inclusive growth. There has also 
been increasing recognition of the role of ‘openness’ and internationalisation in the growth of small open 
economies. But all of these strategies have been stronger on the ‘what’ of growth promotion with much 
less emphasis on the ‘how’. In other words, we need to put more thought and debate into the 
operationalisation and implementation of the promotion of innovation, enterprise, investment and skills 
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formation. It is not new strategies the Scottish economy needs but clear insights and policy action on the 
implementation of Scotland’s Economic Strategy.1 
 
It is against this background that we welcome the creation of the new Economy Secretary post in the 
Scottish Government the appointment of the new Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Derek Mackay MSP 
following the recent election. We also welcome the new Minister Keith Brown’s early initiative in 
instituting a review of Scotland’s enterprise and skills agencies with a brief “… to consider how best to 
deliver and enhance the services and functions those bodies currently provide or need to provide in the 
future, to meet the needs of those engaging with the bodies, as well as to deliver on Ministerial 
ambitions – particularly productivity.” Providing this review is undertaken in a positive way to help 
enhance the operational impact of the agencies, then we hope this marks the beginning of a process 
where strategy implementation moves centre stage in economic policy in Scotland. 
 
Forecasts 
 
Background 
Output and jobs growth in the Scottish economy has weakened since we last reported in March 2016. 
After GDP data revisions it is now clear that with growth of only 0.1% in the second quarter last year and 
then a fall of -0.1% in the third quarter, the Scottish economy came perilously close to a recession in 
2015 and despite the slight upturn to 0.2% growth the fourth quarter may yet not escape a recession in 
the coming months. In the fourth quarter, Scotland had to rely solely on the service sector for growth as 
the contribution of construction faded away to zero with the stimulus from infrastructure spending 
disappearing. Slight negative growth in the production sector meant that the recession in the sector 
continued with negative growth having occurred in three successive quarters. Within production, 
manufacturing technically emerged from recession with fourth quarter growth of 0.3% after experiencing 
falling output in the previous two quarters. But despite that manufacturing growth in Scotland can only be 
described as weak. 
We do not yet have outturn data for GDP in the first quarter 2016 in Scotland but extrapolating from the 
fourth quarter what seems to be happening is that both domestic and overseas demand for Scottish 
goods and services appear to be weakening, while domestic demand is still driving growth in Scotland – 
see Forecasts of the Scottish Economy section below.  In particular in the first two quarters of 2015 
household demand and fixed investment were the sole drivers of growth. In the third quarter general 
government spending also made a small positive contribution to growth, although the continuation of the 
UK Government’s austerity programme means that there is little sustained boost to growth from this 
component of demand. In the fourth quarter household demand and fixed investment were again the 
sole drivers and were both weaker than previously. It now seems clear that both components of demand 
have been badly affected by the continuation of the low price of oil, with job losses affecting household 
incomes and spending and fixed investment affected by the decline in onshore investment in the oil 
service industry and related activities as well as the slowdown in infrastructure spending and 
                                                        
1
 A point raised by the STUC’s Stephen Boyd at the Fraser of Allander Institute’s policy seminar in May 2016. I also 
made a similar point in commenting on the Government’s current Scottish Economic Strategy in my presentation 
Post-election economic challenges: Scotland and the UK at the IPPI/FAI seminar on 1 July 2015. 
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construction activity noted above. Another factor to note is that the household saving ratio in Scotland 
was 6.3% in 2015q4 31% lower than it was in the corresponding quarter of 2014. This fall will clearly 
have helped sustain household spending either by households saving less or borrowing more. However, 
a close look at the data reveals that the ratio fell from 9.1% to 6.8% between 2014q4 and 2015q1, then 
fell a little further to 6.3% in the second quarter and essentially remained there for the rest of the year. 
Household spending was clearly boosted in the first quarter of last year but by the end of the year the 
effect of the change was fading away as households possibly started to rein back their borrowing. In 
addition, wage growth remains weak while the housing market seems to be weakening, which is also 
likely to have a detrimental effect on household spending.  It might also be the case that uncertainty 
about the outcome of the BREXIT referendum on 23rd June might be encouraging companies to 
postpone investment plans until the issue about Britain’s economic relationship with the EU is clarified. 
In this context it is worth noting that net trade has made a negative contribution to Scotland’s GDP 
growth in 4 of the last 5 quarters, while Scottish exports (including trade with rest of UK) in current 
market prices have actually been falling since 2014 and Scottish manufacturing exports to the rest of the 
world fell in real terms in the second half of last year. 
The ONS Release Second Estimate of GDP: Quarter 1 (January to March) 2016 estimated UK GDP in 
volume terms to have grown by 0.4% in the first quarter, the same as the preliminary estimate in April 
but lower than the 0.6% growth achieved in the final quarter of last year. The release also provides detail 
on the expenditure component contribution to UK growth. The picture remains broadly similar to 
Scotland in the fourth quarter of last year, and broadly similar in the first quarter 2016 to the fourth 
quarter 2015, with the exception that the contribution of fixed investment to growth increased, which we 
think unlikely to be the case in Scotland in view of the effects of the oil price fall – notwithstanding the 
recent pick up in the price to around $50 per barrel - and turn down in infrastructure spending. So, we 
must conclude that in the first quarter and probably through the rest of the year, household demand and 
fixed investment will continue to drive growth in Scotland but with the stimulus from household spending 
and fixed investment weakening while net trade continues to have a negative effect as the rate of growth 
in Scotland’s main export markets is predicted to fall.  
The Scottish Chambers’ Quarterly Economic Indicator for the 1st quarter 2016, found that performance 
across the Scottish economy was inconsistent throughout the five key business sectors covered. The 
construction sector, retail & wholesale and tourism were reasonably buoyant, but there was evidence of 
a further weakening in activity in both manufacturing and business and financial services. In some ways 
this is encouraging because it suggests that the weakening in the economy may not be as pervasive as 
first thought. But there is much survey evidence to show that manufacturing in particular is struggling 
north of the border, although the recent outturn data for UK manufacturing in April revealed that 
production increased by 2.3% during the month, the largest rise since July 2012.The latest Scottish 
Engineering survey shows that output and orders have fallen for the sixth consecutive quarter, with 
export orders declining for eleven consecutive quarters. The Bank of Scotland PMI Survey for April 
reported that the output of Scottish private sector firms had stabilised, which ended a two-month 
sequence of contraction. Nonetheless, as the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy section of this 
Commentary notes the Fraser of Allander Institute’s “Nowcasts” of the Scottish economy for the first and 
second quarters of 2016 estimate growth to be weak with forecasts of 0.28% and 0.36%, respectively. 
It is against this background that we have prepared our latest forecasts of the Scottish economy. 
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GVA Forecasts 
For our latest GVA forecasts we continue the presentational procedure adopted in previous 
Commentaries. We present only a central forecast but use estimated forecast errors to establish the 
likely range within which the true first estimate of the growth of Scottish GVA will lie.  
Table 1 presents our forecasts for Scottish GVA - GDP at basic prices - for 2015 to 2017. The forecasts 
are presented in more detail in the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy section of this Commentary.  
 
Table 1: Fraser of Allander Institute Forecasts of Scottish GVA growth, 2016-2018  
 
GVA Growth (% per annum) 2016 2017 2018 
Central forecast 1.4 1.9 2.0 
March 2016 forecast 1.9 2.2 n.a 
UK mean independent new 
forecasts (for May 2016) 1.9 2.1 2.3 
Mean Absolute Error % points +/- 0.52 +/- 1.24 +/- 1.31 
Source: © Fraser of Allander Institute, June 2016 
Table 1 shows that we have revised down our forecast for this year from 1.9% in March 2016 to 1.4%. 
This downward revision is driven by slow investment growth, the continuing effects of the fall in the price 
of oil on household incomes and spending, a general slowing in household spending as the rate of 
household borrowing diminishes and a worsening demand for Scottish exports as global growth and 
growth in Scotland’s key export markets slows. On our central forecast, we are forecasting growth of 
1.9% in 2017 a downward revision to our March forecast of 2.2%. This revision is due to an anticipated 
weakening of both domestic and export demand for goods and services produced in Scotland compared 
to our March forecast. We are now forecasting 2018 and our prediction is that there will be growth of 
2.0% as the economy returns to trend. 
 
Table 1, also compares our GVA forecasts with the median of latest independent forecasts for the UK as 
published by the UK Treasury in February 2016. These show that we expect Scottish growth to be 
weaker than in the UK over the forecast horizon 2016, 2017 and 2018. So, we are forecasting growth of 
1.4% in 2016, 1.9% in 2017 and 2.0% in 2018. Given our previous forecast errors the lower and upper 
bounds for growth in 2016 are expected to be 0.9% and 1.9%; for 2017, 0.7% to 3.1%, and for 2018, 
0.7% to 3.3%. 
 
Production is the major sector exhibiting the fastest growth in 2016, 2017 and 2018 with predictions of 
1.8% in 2016, 2.1% in 2017, and 2.2% in 2018. Growth of construction is forecast to be 0.7% in 2016, 
1.1% in 2017 and 1.2% in 2018. Service sector growth is projected to be 1.3% in 2016, 1.8% in 2017, 
and 1.9% in 2018.  
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Employment Forecasts 
 
Table 2 presents our forecasts for net employee jobs for the years 2015 to 2017 in terms of a central 
and upper and lower forecast. Note that in forecasting employee jobs we are not forecasting self-
employment, which has been an important component of the recent jobs recovery (refer Scottish Labour 
Market section of this Commentary). Moreover, employee jobs can differ from the self-reported 
employment in the monthly Labour Force Survey. 
 
Table 2: Forecast Scottish Net Jobs Growth in Three Scenarios, 2016-2018 
 
 
2016 2017 2018 
Upper 37,950 67,550 79,200 
   March 2016 forecast 50,700 79,400 n.a. 
Central  28,650 39,450 47,379 
   March 2016 forecast  36,800 46,850 n.a. 
Lower 19,400 10,200 16,400 
   March 2016 forecast 24,250 31,200 n.a. 
Source: © Fraser of Allander Institute, June 2016 
We have revised down our forecasts of employee jobs because of the deteriorating conditions in the 
Scottish labour market. The number of total employee jobs is still forecast to increase in each year with 
the number of jobs at the end of 2016 forecast to be 2,445,650, an increase of 1.2% during 2016. Our 
new central forecast is that the Scottish economy will add 28,650 jobs in 2016, down by around 8,000 
from our March forecast, with a net of 39,450 jobs added in 2017, down by more than 7,000 from our 
March forecast. Jobs growth in 2018 is forecast to be 47,379. 
 
This year, we expect 21,800 service sector jobs to be created, with 3,650 added in production, and a 
reduction of -350 in agriculture. Construction jobs are now forecast to rise this year by 1,050. In 
2017/2018, the bulk of the jobs created are again expected to be in the service sector with an additional 
32,850/38,250 jobs forecast, while 4,650/5,350 are added in production, 350/1,800 in agriculture and 
1,650/2,000 in construction. 
 
Unemployment Forecasts 
 
The ILO rate is our preferred measure since it identifies those workers who are out of a job and are 
looking for work, whereas the claimant count simply records the unemployed who are in receipt of 
unemployment benefit. In March 2016 we forecast that the unemployment rate would fall slightly to 5.7% 
(from its 2015 value of 5.8%) by the end of 2016, with a level of unemployment of 153,350. The 
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apparent worsening of many labour market indicators over the last four months, and the revision 
downwards of growth performance of Scotland in 2016 cause us to revise up our forecasts for 
unemployment in both levels and rates. Our latest forecasts for the unemployment rate in Scotland for 
the end of 2016 is now 6.9%, with our forecast for this to fall to 6.7% and then 6.2% by the end of 2017 
and 2018, respectively. 
 
The key unemployment forecasts are summarised in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Forecasts ILO unemployment, 2016-2018 
 
ILO unemployment 2016 2017 2018 
Forecast Rate (ILO un/TEA 16+) 6.9%                  6.7%                   6.2% 
   March 2016 forecast 5.7%   4.8%                 n.a. 
Numbers 183,850                181,050               168,050 
Source: © Fraser of Allander Institute, June 2016 
 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
10 June 2016 
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2 Forecasts of the Scottish economy 
Grant Allan, Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
Abstract  
Growth in Scotland continues to be weak, with survey indicators suggesting that the first half of 2016 has 
seen a period of subdued activity. Growth slowed during the second half of 2015, with the third quarter 
seeing a decline in GDP in Scotland, although growth was positive (1.9%) over the year as a whole. 
While the global environment continues to look particularly muted – with exports likely to slow further 
from already insipid levels, as global trade growth remains muted – the domestic drivers of Scottish 
economic growth through 2015 and the first half of 2016, specifically investment and household 
spending, appear to be weaker in Scotland than across the UK as a whole. We have therefore revised 
down our growth forecasts for 2016, 2017 and 2018, with an associated worsening of the Scottish labour 
market expected over this period. 
Households 
 
Figure 1: Contribution to nominal quarterly growth, Scotland, 2012q1 to 2015q4, % points q-on-q 
 
Sources: Scottish National Accounts Project (SNAP) data (Scottish Government) and Fraser of Allander Institute 
(FAI) calculations. The columns shows the percentage point contribution of each element to quarterly Scottish 
(nominal) GVA growth, while the solid black line shows nominal GVA growth for Scotland for each quarter, e.g. in Q3 
2015, household and government and Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), i.e. investment, contributed positively 
to (nominal) growth in that quarter, while net trade contributed negatively. 
Figure 1 shows the contribution of each expenditure component to nominal growth in the Scottish 
economy over each quarter of the last four years. Three things are particularly striking. First, the 
negative contribution made by net trade over this period, with only two quarters in the last three years 
where trade contributed positively to Scottish growth (Q3 2013 and Q2 2015). For growth to be 
transformed, the performance of Scottish exports needs to be addressed. Second, investment (Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation) has contributed positively in each quarter since the third quarter of 2013. The 
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final quarter of 2014 for example, saw positive nominal growth which was exclusively due to investment 
growth expenditure according to this data. (Real growth was also positive in this quarter). The 
contribution of investment through 2015 in offsetting potentially lower growth rates for Scotland is also 
clear. Third, Scottish households expenditure continues to be driving a major portion of Scotland’s 
recent economic performance.  
With this context in mind trends in Scottish household expenditures become important for Scottish 
growth. The latest results of the Retail Sales Index for Scotland suggest that Scottish household 
spending in the first quarter of 2016 grew in real terms by 0.1%, while in the same period it grew by 
0.3% in the UK. This weaker spending growth would be consistent with a worsening of the Scottish 
labour market compared to the UK over the same period.  We will return to this later.  
 
Figure 2: Household real consumption spending growth, Scotland and UK, 2000q1 to 2015q4, % q-on-q 
 
Sources: Scottish National Accounts Project (SNAP) data (Scottish Government) and UK Quarterly National 
Accounts (National Statistics) and FAI calculations.  
Figure 2 shows the growth in quarterly real household spending for both Scotland and the UK, as 
calculated from official figures produced separately by the ONS and Scottish Government. This shows 
that the growth in household spending in Scotland typically coincides with that of the UK as a whole, but 
can be more volatile. The latest quarter for which data are available (Q4 of 2015) suggests that growth 
of household spending was only 0.04% in Scotland, and 0.52% in the UK. Figure 3 shows the household 
savings rate in both Scotland and the UK. What is evident is firstly the rapid reduction in the savings rate 
in Scotland between the end of 2014 and start of 2015 – which then saw household spending support 
growth through 2015 (Figure 1) – and second, its relative stability since then. Third, the Scottish savings 
rate is roughly two percentage points higher than for the UK as a whole. This suggests that, other things 
being equal, Scottish households have a lower average propensity to spend and likely a lower marginal 
propensity to spend. Further, this higher savings rate is one reason why the positive consequences of 
lower energy prices from the rapid reduction in the price of oil at the end of 2014 and start of 2015 did 
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not translate into more positive household spending and therefore overall economic growth through 
2015. 
 
Figure 3: Household savings ratio, Scotland and UK, 2000q1 to 2016q4, % 
 
Sources: Scottish National Accounts Project (SNAP) data (Scottish Government) and UK Quarterly National 
Accounts (National Statistics) and FAI calculations.  
Investment 
 
Figure 4: Real gross fixed capital formation, Scotland and the UK, 2010q1 to 2015q4 
 
Sources: Scottish National Accounts Project (SNAP) data (Scottish Government) and UK Quarterly National 
Accounts (National Statistics) and FAI calculations.  
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Figure 4 shows the recent developments in investment in both Scotland and the UK, which are again 
calculated from official figures produced separately by the ONS and Scottish Government. They show 
that under these revised data, that the level of investment relative to its 2011 level is broadly similar 
between Scotland and the UK. Currently, the level of investment is around 22% (UK) and 26% 
(Scotland) above their 2011 levels. What is also evident is that the Scottish level of investment 
recovered more quickly than in the UK – through 2012 and 2013, for instance, the “gap” between the two 
reached as much as 15 percentage points (although the Scottish series is again more volatile than that 
for the UK). Investment levels in Scotland and the UK appear to have converged in the last year, 
suggesting a slowing of investment spending in Scotland compared the UK as a whole.  
Trade 
The most recent data on Scottish manufacturing exports to the rest of the world were released on the 
20th April 2016 (“Index of Manufactured Exports”).  These showed that in the final quarter of 2015, 
exports to the rest of the world fell by 1.5%: the second consecutive quarter when Scottish 
(manufacturing) exports (to the rest of the world) fell in real terms. There were particularly pronounced 
falls in exports of Drink – down 5.2% - as well as in Electrical and Instrument Engineering (down 3.5%).  
Table 1 shows the forecasts for growth in key global markets for Scottish products through 2016 and 
2017. The export markets used here differ from those used in our March 2016 Commentary.  They have 
been  selected on the basis of the ‘ultimate’ export destinations for Scottish goods, as identified in 
additional questions now included in the Global Connections Survey (GCS) - rather than by the countries 
noted in GCS as the ‘first destinations’ for Scottish goods and services. The latter measure identifies 
countries that are not necessarily the final destination market, and so is likely to overstate the role of 
markets through which Scottish exports merely transit (e.g. the Netherlands registers as Scotland’s 
largest EU market on the GCS ranking, while on our preferred measure it is not even in the top ten). 
Table 1 identifies the top seven “future export destinations” as reported in GCS.  
The latest forecasts for Scotland’s key international markets have been revised down over the last few 
months. Table 1 shows that the OECD have revised down their forecasts for the USA (down 0.7 
percentage points), Norway (down 0.5 percentage points) and the UK (also down 0.7 percentage 
points). Growth in the US, has been undercut by weak domestic demand, while many emerging 
economies – in particular oil producers – have seen reductions in growth. Global trade – a good 
barometer of growth in economic activity more generally – remains subdued and is only expected to 
increase slightly, and continues to grow more slowly than GDP growth. This is partly driven by an 
increasing on-shoring of value chains in production – particularly by China – which could limit both trade 
growth, as well as lower innovations from learning from exporting firms, and may have a 
disproportionate effect on exporting firms from smaller countries who rely upon selling externally for their 
growth. The OECD’s most recent Economic Outlook talked about the need for “comprehensive national 
policies, incorporating more proactive fiscal prioritisation and revived structural ambition”. The recovery 
through 2017 appears more uncertain, and growth in key Scottish export markets – such as the UK as a 
whole – have been revised further down for that period. 
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Table 1: Economic growth forecasts for 2016 and 2017 for Scotland’s key export destinations, including 
UK, Japan and the Euro area, % p.a. 
  2016    2017  
 Rank (2014 
exports1) 
IMF (April 
2016) 
OECD 
(June 2016) 
Revision since 
Dec ‘15 
  
IMF (April 
2016) 
OECD 
(June 2016) 
Revision 
since Dec 
’15 
          
USA 1 2.4 1.8 -0.7   2.5 2.2 -0.2 
China 13 6.5 6.5 0.0   6.2 6.2 0.0 
Germany 4 1.5 1.6 -0.2   1.6 1.7 -0.3 
France 3 1.1 1.4 +0.1   1.3 1.5 -0.1 
Australia 15 2.5 2.6 0.0   3.0 2.9 -0.1 
Norway 5 1.0 0.6 -0.5   1.5 1.3 -0.6 
Canada 16 1.5 1.7 +0.3   1.9 2.2 +0.1 
    
   
  
 
United 
Kingdom 
- 1.9 1.7 
-0.7   
2.2 2.0 
-0.3 
Japan 20 0.5 0.7 -0.3   -0.1 0.4 -0.4 
Euro area - 1.5 1.6 -0.2   1.6 1.7 -0.2 
Sources: World Economic Outlook Update (International Monetary Fund, IMF, April 2016) and Economic Outlook 
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, June 2016) Notes: 1 = Sourced from Export 
Statistics Scotland. “-” indicates that a country is not listed as a destination for international exports from Scotland. 
 
Forecasts for the Scottish economy: detail 
In this section we look at the likely impacts on both the domestic and external economic environment for 
Scotland over the years 2016, 2017 and 2018. This is the first time that we have forecast for 2018. 
We noted earlier that both net trade and government spending contributed negatively to nominal growth 
in the final quarter of 2015, with growth supported by household spending and investment (GFCF). Both 
of these two elements however were down between the third and fourth quarters of 2015. Additionally, 
the range of surveys for Scottish economy activity suggest an ongoing weakness in business investment 
intentions. For this reason, we have revised down our forecast for the growth of investment through 
2016 and 2017. It is plausible that some of the reductions in expected business investment could be 
driven by fears of uncertainty over a vote in favour of “Brexit” in the EU referendum on the 23rd of June 
2016. What is more surprising perhaps is the broad evidence for reductions in investment, across most 
sectors, and most firm sizes, where one might expect a more heterogeneous picture. This perhaps 
suggests that there are more systemic weaknesses to the economic picture than those to be resolved by 
the outcome of the EU referendum.  
We continue to produce forecasts and update them on a monthly basis at www.nowcastingscotland.com  
in an attempt to “nowcast” economic growth currently (and in advance of official measures, which are 
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produced with a significant lag). The latest nowcasts estimate growth in the first and second quarters of 
2016 to be 0.28% and 0.36% respectively. Both are only slightly up from the growth seen in the final 
quarter of 2015 (0.22%), and well below the growth rates seen in 2014. Our nowcasts appear to offer 
little evidence for optimism for anything approaching trend growth for the Scottish economy through the 
first half of 2016. 
The Scottish economy continues to be impacted by the continuing lower price of oil (and the knock-on 
effect across the UK economy, and the disproportionate impact upon Scotland). Prices have risen above 
$50/barrel in the last few weeks, and up from the $35/barrel seen during January 2016. This will 
however have no immediate impact on exploration and production drilling work, as such decisions take 
time to lead to visible signs of orders and investment. DECC figures report that in the final quarter of 
2015 only a single exploration well was drilled in the UK continental shelf (UKCS), alongside 20 
development wells – the second lowest number of wells drilled since the quarterly series began in 1998. 
Evidence from a number of business surveys of firms with activity in the UKCS suggest that continued 
redundancies are expected across the sector. Shell’s recent announcement of (a further) 475 jobs 
losses from its UK and Ireland workforce (and reductions by other firms across the sector) points to a 
sector where confidence remains at historically weak levels. 
Latest forecasts for key international markets have been revised down over the last few months – as 
noted earlier – the IMF predict that the global economy is now expected to grow by 3.2% in 2016, down 
by 0.2% from its January 2016 forecast. In part this reflects continued slowdown in the Chinese 
economy, which – along with market specific factors – is continuing to depress commodity prices. They 
point to a general weakness in investment and trade and rising political factors that are impacting on 
uncertainty, which is expected to depress activity through the rest of this year. On the IMF’s forecasts, 
global growth is expected to increase in 2017 by 3.5%, particularly driven by an increase in emerging 
and developing economies. The lower rate of global growth, in particular in Scotland’s main export 
markets, which are largely developed economies cause us to revise down our forecast for the rate of 
export growth through this year and next. 
Household spending has positively contributed to Scotland’s recent economic performance. The latest 
evidence suggests that conditions in the Scottish labour market overall have worsened through the end 
of 2015 and the start of 2016, and that Scotland is diverging from the UK as a whole. The unemployment 
rate in Scotland increased in the first quarter of the year, while it was broadly unchanged across the UK 
as a whole. The unemployment rate in Scotland in the first quarter of 2016 was 6.2%, more than one 
percentage point above the unemployment rate for the UK in the same period (5.1%). At the same time, 
the region of the UK with the largest fall in the employment rate was Scotland, down to 73.1% (UK 
overall was 74.2%).  The number of people in work fell by 53,000 in the final quarter of 2015 while the 
number unemployed rose by 8,000. For these reasons we have slightly revised down our forecasts for 
household spending growth during 2016 and 2017. 
Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts: 2016, 2017 and 2018 
In this section we forecast year-on-year real growth in Scotland’s key economic and labour market 
variables and do so for all variables for 2016, 2017 and – for the first time –2018. Our forecasts cover 
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Scotland’s Gross Value Added (GVA), employee jobs and ILO unemployment. The model used is multi-
sectoral, and where useful, results are reported to broad sectoral categories. 
We begin with the forecasts for GVA growth in the Scottish economy. The growth performance of 
Scotland between 2010 and 2015 and our forecasts for the period to 2018 are shown in Figure 5. We 
note that the outturn data for the final quarter of 2015 confirmed growth of 1.9% for last year, the same 
as our forecasts for growth in that year from both our March 2016 and November 2015 commentaries. 
Incidentally, this 1.9% growth rate was forecast the very first time that we forecast growth for 2015, in 
our March 2013 Commentary forecast. Figure 5 also includes our upper and lower forecasts of growth. 
As previously, the range around the central forecast is based on our past forecast accuracy of the first 
release of growth data for the year.  
Based on FAI forecasts between 2000 and 2015, the mean absolute error of forecasts (i.e. the 
difference between the rate forecast and the outturn rate from official sources) made around June and 
growth in that year (i.e. 2016 in this forecast) is 0.52 percentage points. The mean absolute errors of 
forecast errors made in summer for the year ahead (i.e. our current forecast for 2017) are 1.24 
percentage points. This gives the range for the upper and lower bands in 2016 and 2017. While our past 
forecast error for the year subsequent to the following year (i.e. made now for the calendar year 2018) 
forecast horizon is 1.31 percentage points. This is used to give the range around our central forecast for 
GVA growth in 2018. 
 
Figure 5: FAI Forecasts of annual real GVA (%) growth for Scotland, 2010 to 2018 
 
Sources: © Fraser of Allander Institute, June 2016 
Relative to our March 2016 forecasts, we have now revised down our short-term forecasts for growth in 
the Scottish economy. Our central forecast for GVA growth in 2016 is now 1.4% (i.e. a downward 
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suggesting a contraction of domestic investment activity and worsening export performance over the rest 
of 2016. Our forecast for 2017 has been revised down from 2.2% to 1.9%, due to a further weakening of 
both local (i.e. Scottish and rest of the UK “domestic” demand) and a further worsening of the global 
growth picture over the last four months.  Our first forecast for growth in 2018 is that the Scottish 
economy will grow by 2.0%. Thus, in the coming three years, we forecast growth in Scotland to not 
exceed its pre-recession trend growth rate. 
For comparison purposes, in March of 2016, the UK’s Office for Budgetary Responsibility (OBR) forecast 
UK growth in 2016 of 2.0%, while in May 2016 the median of independent forecasts for the UK in 2016 - 
made in the last three months - was for growth of 1.9%. The OBR’s forecast for growth in 2017 is 2.2%, 
while the median of new forecasts for that year is 2.2%.  
In addition to the aggregate growth forecasts in our central scenario, Table 3 presents our forecasts for 
GVA growth in 2016, 2017 and 2018 for three broad sectoral groupings within the Scottish economy: 
“Production”, “Construction” and “Services”.  
 
Table 3: FAI Forecast Scottish GVA growth (%) by sector, 2016 to 2018 
 2016 2017 2018 
GVA 1.4 1.9 2.0 
    
Production 1.8 2.1 2.2 
Construction 0.7 1.1 1.2 
Services 1.3 1.8 1.9 
Source: © Fraser of Allander Institute, June 2016 
Employment and unemployment 
Detailed commentary on recent developments in the Scottish labour markets can be found in the 
Overview of the Scottish Labour Market section of this Commentary. Here we present our forecasts for 
the number of employee jobs in the Scottish economy. We forecast the number, sectoral breakdown and 
percentage changes in employee jobs at the end of 2016, 2017 and 2018 respectively, as well as the 
ILO measure of unemployment over the same period. 
The most up to date employee jobs series for Scotland shows that there were 2,417,000 employee jobs 
in Scotland in the final quarter of 2015, an increase of 30,000 jobs from the end of 2015. The rate of jobs 
growth has slowed over the years since 2013: with 66,000 and 40,000 employee jobs added in 2013 and 
2014 respectively. 
Our new forecasts for employee jobs are shown in Table 4, alongside a sectoral breakdown of employee 
job numbers. The number of total employee jobs is forecast to increase in each year, however the 
number of jobs forecast to be added in 2016, 2017 and 2018 have been revised down slightly since our 
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March 2016 forecasts. The number of jobs at the end of 2016 is forecast to be 2,445,650, an increase of 
1.2% during 2016. Our new forecast is that the Scottish economy will add 28,650 jobs in 2016, down by 
around 8,000 from our March 2016 forecast. Thus, we forecast a continuation of the slowing rate of 
absolute jobs growth - seen since 2013 – to continue through to 2016. Jobs growth is forecasted to 
increase in 2017, with a net addition of 39,450 jobs. The net change in employee jobs over the next 
three years, consistent with our upper, central and lower forecasts, is shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 4: FAI Forecasts of Scottish employee jobs (‘000s, except where stated) and net change in 
employee jobs in central forecast, 2016 to 2018 
 2016 2017 2018 
Total forecast employee jobs, Dec 2,445,650 2,485,100 2,532,500 
Net forecast annual change (jobs) 28,650 39,450 47,400 
% change from previous year 1.2 1.6 1.9 
 
   
Agriculture (jobs, 000s) 26 27 28 
Annual change 
-350 350 1,800 
Production (jobs, 000s) 262 267 272 
Annual change 3,650 4,650 5,350 
Construction (jobs, 000s) 141 143 145 
Annual change 1,050 1,650 2,000 
Services (jobs, 000s) 2,016 2,049 2,087 
Annual change 21,800 32,850 38,250 
 
Note: Absolute job numbers are rounded to the nearest 50.  
Source: © Fraser of Allander Institute, June 2016  
Scottish unemployment rate since 2006 as well as our ILO unemployment rate forecasts under the 
central, upper and lower scenarios to 2017. 
 
Table 5: FAI Forecast Scottish net annual change in employee jobs in central, upper and lower forecast, 
2016 to 2018 
 2016 2017 2018 
Upper 37,950 67,550 79,200 
Central 28,650 39,450 47,379 
Lower 19,400 10,200 16,400 
    
 
Note: Absolute job numbers are rounded to the nearest 50.  
Source:© Fraser of Allander Institute, June 2016  
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We present our forecasts for unemployment at the end of 2016, 2017 and 2018 in our central scenario in 
Table 6. In line with the forecasts produced since June 2013, we report the forecast number (and rate) of 
those unemployed using the International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition. This is preferred to the 
claimant count measure as it gives a more complete picture of the extent of labour resources available 
for work but unable to find work, and so is a better measures of the level of spare capacity in the 
Scottish labour market. 
 
Table 6: FAI Forecast of Scottish unemployment in central forecasts, 2016 to 2018 
 2016 2017 2018 
ILO unemployment (numbers) 183,850 181,050 168,050 
Rate (%)1 6.9 6.7 6.2 
    
 
Source: © Fraser of Allander Institute, June 2016  
Note: Absolute numbers are rounded to the nearest 50. 1 = Rate calculated as total ILO unemployment divided by 
total of economically active population aged 16 and over. The most recent labour market statistics are detailed in the 
Labour Market section. 
 
Figure 5: Scottish ILO unemployment rate, 2009 to 2018 including forecasts from 2016 
 
Sources: ONS and Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts, June 2016  
In March 2016 we forecast that the unemployment rate would fall slightly to 5.7% (from its 2015 value of 
5.8%) by the end of 2016, with a level of unemployment of 153,350. The clear worsening of many labour 
market indicators over the last four months, the continued weak survey evidence for a rebounding 
economic recovery and the revision downwards of growth performance of Scotland in 2016 cause us to 
revise up our forecasts for unemployment in both levels and rates. Our latest forecasts for the 
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unemployment rate in Scotland for the end of 2016 is now 6.9%, with our forecast for this to fall to 6.7% 
and then 6.2% by the end of 2017 and 2018 respectively. Figure 5 shows the trajectory of the ILO. 
 
 
Grant Allan 
10 June 2016 
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3 Review of Scottish Business Surveys 
Eleanor Malloy, Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
Abstract  
Business surveys are a useful tool to provide accurate and timely data and are extremely helpful in 
pinpointing subtle movements and also turning points in the economy. The business surveys reviewed 
here provide an overview of key recent evidence of the Scottish economy. Once again the latest set of 
Scottish Business Surveys are not particularly strong and show that many of the key benchmark 
indicators continued to slow in the most recent quarters.  For business the economic outlook remains 
muted, perhaps reflecting the oil price fall and its onshore impact in Scotland, especially in the North 
East and on the supply chain, as well as uncertainty surrounding the EU referendum. This sense of 
uncertainty is most tangible for the business optimism and investment key balances and it is concerning 
that many of the forward-looking indicators indicate an easing of trends. 
 
The Bank of Scotland Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) 
 
The seasonally adjusted headline Bank of Scotland PMI - a single-figure measure of the month-on-
month change in combined manufacturing and services output - scored 48.5 in March 2016, falling 
from February’s 49.2 which in turn was down on the January figure of 50.3. The January PMI showed 
a further deterioration in the Scottish private sector.  The survey showed that both the service sector 
and, more significantly, the manufacturing sector contracted in March. The survey indicated that 
output, new business and employment all continued to decline.  
 
RBS (Scottish) Business Monitor 
 
The latest RBS (Scottish) Business Monitor produced in conjunction with The Fraser of Allander 
Institute (results for December 2015, January 2016 and February 2016, and expectations to August 
2016) shows the Scottish economy slowed further during this period. The outturn this quarter for many 
key balances was significantly worse than the previous survey and down on expectations expressed in 
the previous survey.  The rate of recovery is still being constrained by companies in the North East.  
New business levels d e c l i n e d  during the three months to the end of February with an overall net 
balance of -8% compared to +3% of the previous quarter and also down on the +2% of the same quarter 
one year ago. Expectations are that this slowdown in the rate of recovery will continue and growth in 
Scotland is set to slow further with the fall in oil prices having a net negative impact on Scotland 
compared to the rest of the UK. 
 
Firms’ assessments of their immediate prospects in the next six months were on a rising trend 
throughout 2013 and reached highs in the first two quarters of 2014. The remainder of 2014 and into 
2015 showed lower but still positive levels of expectations. Last quarter, expectation levels eased but 
largely remained positive whereas this quarter many declined to become negative. This is the thirteenth 
successive Business Monitor showing a positive net balance for turnover expectations although the 
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balance has eased to +2%; down from +4% last quarter and down from +14% compared to Q1 2015. 
The expectation levels recorded by respondents in this latest survey suggest the private sector of the 
Scottish economy will show growth below trend level in the first quarter of 2016. 
 
These expectation levels suggest the private sector of the Scottish economy will show growth below 
trend level in the first quarter of 2016, and suggests slower growth in the six months to August 2016, 
compared to the period to November 2015. Expectations of growth have generally eased or fallen and 
suggest that current growth rates will be maintained in the early part  of 2016. 
 
On a positive note domestic demand is still growing, inflation remains low, earnings/income growth is 
picking up slowly, interest rates remain low, and external demand for goods and services is being boosted 
by the continued resilience of the US economy and a gradual pick-up in growth in the Eurozone.  
However some threats to Scotland’s economic growth remain namely the lower price of oil, unbalanced 
growth as household spending remains the key driver - fueled largely by rising household debt - net trade 
continues to be strongly negative – with exports weak - fiscal austerity and finally the current uncertainty 
surrounding the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU. 
 
Total volumes of business had, up until the previous quarter, been showing a slowly improving trend 
however in the latest quarter a net of -19% reported a decline, further down on the -3% of the previous 
quarter and also down on the +7% of the same quarter one year ago. This is the lowest net balance 
since the first quarter of 2011.  
 
x The overall net balance of turnover (those reporting an increase minus those reporting a 
decrease) fell significantly to -21%, this is down from the +1% of the previous quarter and from 
the 0% of the same quarter one year ago. This is the lowest net balance since the first quarter 
of 2011.  
 
x Export activity is continuing, on balance, to fall. The overall net balance for export activity at 
íGRZQRQWKHíRIWKHSUHYLRXVTXDUWHUDQGDOVRVLJQLILFDQWO\ZRUVHWKDQWKHRI
the same quarter one year ago.  
 
x Firms are significantly more concerned over weakening demand compared to the previous 
quarter with the percentage of firms citing it as ‘very important’ or ‘important’ increasing from 
81% to 84%. 
 
x Concerns over credit costs and more notably credit availability remain relatively low for both 
production and service firms. 
 
x Firms located in the North East continue to perform worse than those located elsewhere. 
 
x Firms with a turnover of between £5 million and  £10 million are reporting the most positive 
trends with those with a turnover of up to £5 million and those with a turnover of more than £10 
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million  reporting more negative trends.  Firms with a turnover of more than £500,000 are 
expecting an increase in the total volume of new business. 
 
x Expectations are that this slowdown in the rate of recovery will continue and growth in Scotland 
is set to slow further with falling oil prices having a net negative impact on Scotland compared 
to the rest of the UK. 
 
Figure 1: Trend in business turnover, % net balance of respondents 
Source RBS Scottish Business Monitor 
 
In the three months ending February 2016, 22% of the firms surveyed increased turnover, 35% 
experienced static turnover and 43% experienced a decrease. The overall net balance (those reporting 
an increase minus those reporting a decrease) is -21.5%, down from the +1% of the previous quarter 
and from the zero balance of the same quarter one year ago. This latest result i s  t h e  l o w e s t  n e t  
b a l a n c e  s i n c e  t h e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  o f  2 0 1 1 .  
 
The overall net balance of turnover for firms in the production sector in the three months to end February 
2016 was -27%. This is significantly down from 0% of the previous quarter and also on the -5% of the 
same quarter one year ago. Services firms showed an overall net balance for turnover for the three 
months ending February 2016 of -18%, well down on the +2% of the previous quarter and also from the 
+4% of the same quarter one year ago.  Expectations for turnover in the next six months ending 
February 2016 are showing an overall net balance of +2%. Although still positive this is down on the 
+4% of the previous quarter and also down on the +15% of the same quarter one year ago. Whilst 49% 
expect turnover to be static in the next six months, 27% expect turnover to increase against 24% who 
expect a decrease. Services firms remain more optimistic than production firms, with service firms 
showing an overall net balance for turnover for the next six months at +3% (+6% in the previous quarter)  
compared to +2% ( +1% in the previous quarter) for production firms. 
 
Volumes of repeat business are showing a decline in the latest quarter. In the three months ending 
February 2016, 12.1% of the firms surveyed increased repeat business, 59.9% experienced static new 
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business and 28.0% experienced a decrease. The overall net balance of -16% is significantly worse than 
the -3% of the previous quarter and also markedly worse than the +1% of the same quarter one year 
ago. 
 
Figure 2:  Trend in the volume of repeat business, % net balance of respondents 
 
Source RBS Scottish Business Monitor 
 
The overall net balance of repeat business for firms in the production sector in the three months to end 
February 2016 was –14.3%. This has down from the –1.3% of the previous quarter and also down on 
the -2% of the same quarter one year ago. Services firms showed an overall net balance for turnover for 
the three months ending February of –16.8%, down on the -4.7% of the previous quarter and also from 
the +1% of the same quarter one year ago.   Expectations for the volume of repeat business were, once 
again, down on the levels of the last quarter with an overall net balance of-5% for this quarter compared 
to +2% for the previous quarter; significantly down on +10% for the same quarter one year ago. 
 
Production firms are marginally less pessimistic than service firms, with service firms showing an overall 
net balance for repeat business for the next six months at -4% (+0.5% in the previous quarter)  
compared to -6% ( +3% in the previous quarter) for production firms. 
 
Trends in the volume of new business declined during the three months to the end of February 2016 
with an overall net balance of -8% compared to +3% of the previous quarter, down also on the +2% of 
the same quarter one year ago. During the summer new business volumes appeared to have recovered 
to the levels seen in 2014 after a poor six month period at the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015 but 
this appears to have been a temporary position as the levels have declined. 
 
The overall net balance of new business for firms in the production sector in the three months to end 
February 2016 was –21.7%. This is significantly down from the -3.4% of the previous quarter and also 
down on the +6% of the same quarter one year ago. Services firms showed an overall net balance for 
turnover for the three months ending February of +0.5%, down on the +7% of the previous quarter and 
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also from the 0% of the same quarter one year ago.   Expectations for the volume of new business in the 
next six months have declined with the latest net balance at -3% – down on the +6% of the previous 
quarter and also down on the +14% of the same quarter one year ago.  Service firms are showing an 
overall net balance for expectations of new business for the next six months at -2.8% (+8% in the 
previous quarter)  compared to -2.5% ( +1% in the previous quarter) for production firms. 
 
Figure 3: Trend in the volume of new business, % net balance of respondents 
 
Source RBS Scottish Business Monitor 
 
 
Figure 4:  Trend in the total volume of business, % net balance of respondents 
 
Source RBS Scottish Business Monitor 
 
During 2015 total volumes of business had been showing a slowly improving trend however in the latest 
quarter a net of -18.9% reported a decline, down on the -3% of the previous quarter and also down on 
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the +2% of the same quarter one year ago. These downward trends are evident across both production 
(-19.0%) and services firms (-18.9%). 
The overall net balance of the total volume of business for firms in the production sector in the three 
months to end February 2016 was –19%. This is significantly down from the -1% of the previous quarter 
and also down on the -5% of the same quarter one year ago. Services firms showed an overall net 
balance for turnover for the three months ending February of –18.9%, significantly down on the -5% of 
the previous quarter and also from the +7% of the same quarter one year ago.  
 
Expectations for the total volume of business in the next six months have remained broadly unchanged  
with the latest net balance at +4.5% – very marginally down on the +5% of the previous quarter but 
down further from the +15% of the same quarter one year ago. Service firms are now slightly less 
optimistic than production firms, with service firms showing an overall net balance for new business for 
the next six months at +3.8% (+7% in the previous quarter)  compared to +5.6% ( +3% in the previous 
quarter) for production firms. 
 
Figure 5:  Trend in export activity, % net balance of respondents 
 
Source RBS Scottish Business Monitor 
Export activity is continuing, on balance, to fall. The overall net EDODQFH IRUH[SRUWDFWLYLW\DWí LV
PDUJLQDOO\GRZQRQWKHíRIWKHSUHYLRXVTXDUWHUDQGDOVRZRUVHWKDQWKHRIWKHVDPHTXDUWHU
one year ago.   Net trade (exports minus imports) continues to be strongly negative, exacerbated by 
slowdown in China and a slowing of the growth of world trade. This feeds back to Scottish activity both 
through lower exports and a low price of oil affecting activity across the country, and particularly in the 
North East of Scotland.  
 
The net balance for expected export activity for the next six months has worsened. The net balance 
UHDFKHGí– ZHOOGRZQRQWKHíRIODVWTXDUWHUDQGDOVRZRUVHWKDQWKHRIWKHsame quarter 
one year ago. 
 
-1 
-14 
12 14 13 
-4 
6 
-24 
-9 
-10 
-22 
-23 
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 40(1)  Scottish economy 
 
June 2016            41 
The overall net balance of the total volume of business for firms in the production sector in the three 
months to end February 2016 was –24.4%. This is significantly down from the -10.6% of the previous 
quarter and also down on the +6% of the same quarter one year ago. Services firms showed an overall 
net balance for turnover for the three months ending February of –20.0%, significantly down on the -
9.8% of the previous quarter and also from the +6% of the same quarter one year ago.  
 
Expectations for export activity in the next six months have fallen with the latest net balance at –23.3% – 
this down on the  –6% of the previous quarter and is also down on the +2% of the same quarter one 
year ago.  Service firms are less pessimistic than production firms, with service firms showing an overall 
net balance for export activity for the next six months at –17.8% (-10% in the previous quarter)  
compared to –29.3% ( -2% in the previous quarter) for production firms. 
 
Figure 6:  Trend in costs, % net balance of respondents 
Source RBS Scottish Business Monitor 
Cost pressures were broadly unchanged in the latest quarter. The overall net balance of firms 
experiencing cost increases in the last three months was +19% – this has eased from the +30% of the 
previous quarter and also from the +23% of the same quarter one year ago. 
 
The overall net balance of costs for firms in the production sector in the three months to end February 
2015 was +18.4%. This has eased from the +31% of the previous quarter and is also marginally down 
on the +19% of the same quarter one year ago. Services firms showed an overall net balance of costs 
for the three months ending February of +20%, down on the +28% of the previous quarter and also from 
the +25% of the same quarter one year ago.  
 
Expectations for future cost increases have fallen slightly. The overall net balance for cost expectations 
is +21% – down from the previous quarter’s +25% and lower than the +26% of the same quarter one 
year ago. Whilst 61% expect their costs to remain static, 30% expect an increase as opposed to 9% who 
expect a decrease in the next six months. Production firms are facing a larger increase in costs than 
service firms, with service firms showing an overall net balance for the trend in costs for the next six 
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months at +18% (+3% in the previous quarter)  compared to +23% ( +22% in the previous quarter) for 
production firms. 
 
Figure 7:  Trend in capital investment, % net balance of respondents 
Source RBS Scottish Business Monitor 
As forecast by firms from the previous survey the rate of capital investment declined in Q1.  For the last 
three months, 48% of firms reported static levels of capital investment, 30% a decrease while 21% 
reported an increase giving a net balance of -8.8%, down on both the levels last quarter -5% and also 
compared to the same quarter one year ago -1%.  
 
The overall net balance of the rate of capital investment for firms in the production sector in the three 
months to end February 2015 was –9.5%. This has eased marginally from the -11% of the previous 
quarter but is down from the +1% of the same quarter one year ago. Services firms showed an overall 
net balance of capital investment for the three months ending February of -8.4%, down on the 0% of the 
previous quarter and also from the -2% of the same quarter one year ago.  
 
Expectations for new capital investment the next six months ending February 2016 are showing an 
overall net balance of –12.9%; down on the –6% of the previous quarter and also down on the -1% of 
the same quarter one year ago.  Services firms remain marginally less pessimistic than production firms, 
with service firms showing an overall net balance for new capital investment  for the next six months at –
9.1% (-1% in the previous quarter)  compared to –18.3% (-13% in the previous quarter) for production 
firms. 
 
Scottish Chambers of Commerce Quarterly Economic Indicator Quarter 1 2016 
 
Construction 
 
Construction respondents to the QEI were fairly buoyant, business confidence rose from +4% in Q4 
2015 to +20% in Q1.   Sales revenues, on balance remained positive for a net of 26% of firms and 
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positive trends in sales revenue are expected to continue in Q2 with 61% of businesses predicting a rise.  
Almost half of all respondents reported an increase in the volume of total new contracts, with a net 
balance of +24%, the highest net % balance reported since Q4 2014. 
 
Generally pressure to raise prices appears to have increased as 49% of firms reported an increase in 
prices and only 3% reported a fall. Almost 40% of construction firms reported that wages increased over 
the quarter.  On balance firms reported a positive net balance of +7% for total investment although a net 
balance of 3% reported a fall in capital investment.  
 
Figure 8:  Scottish Construction Sales Revenue, 2014q4 – 2016q1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Scottish Chambers of Commerce Economic Intelligence Unit 
 
Financial & business services 
 
Following a disappointing quarter in terms of sales revenue in Q4 of 2015, businesses in the sector 
experienced another quarter of declining growth with a 43.2% of firms reporting a decrease in total sales 
revenue over Q1 2016  the quarter. Negative net balances were reported for domestic sales (-18), sales 
revenue from the rest of the UK (-12), and revenue generated by exports (-22).  Profits declined for the 
fourth consecutive quarter with a net balance of -26% reporting a decline. A decline in cashflow  was 
reported by a net  balance of -23% the lowest figure recorded since Q1 2014. 
 
Employment levels decreased for a net balance of -6% of firms although the majority of businesses 
(52.1%) reported that employment levels remained the unchanged Q1 and 59.5% of businesses expect 
employment over the next quarter to remain stable. 
 
The financial and business services sector has experienced negative growth since the second half of 
2015. A net balance of businesses have indicated that they expect both investment (-8%) and 
employment (-1%) to remain in negative territory in Q2 although a net balance of 7% expect a rise in 
sales revenue.  
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Business optimism dipped to the lowest net balance since Q3 2012 with a net balance of -10% reporting 
a fall. Despite the decline in business optimism levels of investment remained buoyant with over 80% of 
businesses indicating that total investment had either increased or remained unchanged over the 
quarter.  
 
Figure 9:  Financial and business services profit, 2014q4 – 2016q1  
 
Source:  Scottish Chambers of Commerce Economic Intelligence Unit 
 
Manufacturing 
 
A net balance of -17% of manufacturers reported a fall in total orders, the lowest figure recorded since 
Q3 2012. There were net declines in Scottish orders (-19), rest of UK orders (-13) and export orders (-
15).  Despite the trends in orders falling into negative territory, more than half (54.3%) of businesses 
expect total new orders to increase in Q2 2016. The majority of businesses expected orders to increase 
or remain level in Q2. 
 
A net balance of +15% of firms reported a rise in employment and employment levels are expected to 
rise or remain unchanged by 81.3% of businesses during Q2 2016.  Also 72.9% of business indicated 
that they were currently recruiting and around a third of firms currently indicated that they were 
experiencing recruitment difficulties.   
 
Retail and wholesale 
 
Business optimism improved for a net balance of 10% of distribution firms during the three months to the 
end of March 2016.  A net balance of +10% reported a rise in total sales with firms reporting net rises in 
export (+4%)  and online sales (+19%);  however, domestic sales were, on balance unchanged and rest 
of UK sales declined for a net of 7% of respondents. 
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Total investment expenditure improved for a net of 8% of firms with net increases in both capital (+2%) 
and training investment (+2%). Investment is expected to continue to increase in Q2 2016 for 22.2% of 
retail and wholesale firms.  Profitability declined for a net of 4% of firms.  
Employment levels changed for fewer than half of firms and 72.9% of firms expect no change to their 
staff numbers during the three months to June 2016.  
 
Tourism 
 
Sales revenue rose for a net balance of 28% of firms over the quarter, with sales from Scotland 
increasing for a net of 25% of firms. Sales revenue is expected to continue to rise in Q2, with 60% of 
firms anticipating an increase. However despite positive trend balances for the number of total guests, 
sales revenue and investment a negative net balance was recorded for profits (-10%).  The total number 
of Guests/ Customers grew in comparison with the same time last year for a net balance of +17%, with 
net rises in coming from Scotland (+23%). Although a net balance of 0 was reported for guests coming 
from the rest of the UK, and business experienced a net fall in the number of guests from the rest of EU 
(-10%) and from outside the EU (-3%). 
 
Investment levels continued to increase albeit at a slower rate than in the previous quarter with a net 
balance of +13% reporting a rise compared to +25% reported in Q4 of 2015, and also lower than the 
+21% reported for the same time last year. However, investment is expected to increase or remain 
unchanged in Q2 of 2016 for 80% of businesses.  Most businesses in the tourism sector expect to 
increase prices in Q2 of 2016 as and only 7.1% expected their prices to fall. 
 
Employment levels increased for a net balance of +17%. Firms expect positive trends in employment to 
continue in Q2 with 93.1% of firms stating that they expect employment levels to rise or remain the 
unchanged. Recruitment problems persist throughout the sector, with 41% of firms facing difficulties 
recruiting during Q1 2016. 
 
Scottish Engineering Quarterly Review 
 
The Scottish Engineering Quarterly Review for the first quarter of 2016 showed little change from the 
survey of Q4 2015 in that orders and output remained negative, optimism remained low however 
employment once again, was to some degree stronger. Optimism was broadly unchanged with small 
and medium firms reporting negative trends whereas larger firms were more confident. 
 
The trend in total order intake improved compared to last quarter but the trend remained negative (-
11%); once again small and medium sized companies reported negative trends but large companies 
remained positive. Forecasts for the next three months of UK orders in show that the trend is expected 
to ease slightly but remain, on balance, negative.  A net balance of firms predict that export trends will 
remain negative during Q2 2016 – though only for small and medium sized firms.  Overall, output 
volumes in general remained negative for small and medium sized firms whereas large companies 
reported a rise and predictions for the next three months in general are slightly better with both medium 
and large firms expecting a rise. 
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Respondents on balance reported a slight rise in prices and in Q2 2016 small and medium companies 
are forecasting a further fall although large companies are predicting a positive balance.  Capital 
investment plans, in general, remained negative whereas training investment plans remained positive.  
 
Employment trends remain broadly unchanged with similar numbers of firms recruiting staff as reported 
shedding staff however forecasts for the next quarter predict that small and medium sized firms will, on 
balance, shed staff. 
 
Scottish Construction Monitor 
 
For the eleventh consecutive quarter the overall confidence rating of the Scottish construction sector 
remained positive at +3 although the rating dropped 5 points during Q1 2016.  The percentage of 
respondents more confident about their prospects for the next 12 months compared to the past year 
rose marginally from 33% last quarter to 35% this quarter. The percentage of respondents less confident 
about their firm’s future prospects has also risen marginally from 25% in Q4 2015 to 26% this quarter  
 
In anticipation of referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union, the latest Construction 
Monitor asked a series of questions about Scottish construction companies’ level of exposure to the 
European Union in terms of labour, supplies and exports. Participants were asked questions about the 
impact on their business if the UK were to leave the European Union. The survey found that almost one 
quarter of respondents employ labour from EU countries and a third of respondents procure goods 
and/or services from other EU countries.  Only 6% of Scottish construction respondents export to other 
EU countries.  Thirty one percent of all respondents reported that there would be a negative impact on 
the Scottish construction sector if the UK were to leave the EU compared to 7% who believe the impact 
would be positive. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The economy appears to be settling into a pattern of ‘lower and slower for longer’ growth; with the 
economy still growing, but growing less strongly. This latest round of Scottish Business Surveys 
indicated that there are some signs of growth in the economy although many show that Scottish firms 
are continuing to face considerable challenges. Uncertaintly surrounding a number of issues including 
the EU referendum is affecting optimism and investment and if capital investment plans fall then this will 
affect growth into the future. Growth in the UK is still, to an extent, reliant on household spending and in 
order to sustain growth over the longer term, an increase in investment and net exports as well as 
manufacturing and construction activity is needed.  Confidence levels among Scottish businesses need 
to reach and maintain a point where firms have the confidence to invest for the longer term. 
 
 
 
Eleanor Malloy 
7 June 2016 
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China’s growth prospects and the ‘two’ Chinas 
 
Jim Walker and Justin Pyvis, Asianomics Group Limited 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In the first three decades of the former Soviet Union its rate of urbanisation was approximately the same 
as it has been in China since 19781. Yet despite plenty of platitudes from Western academics, politicians 
and members of the media, the Soviet Union eventually collapsed under the weight of its own 
contradictions. While it was easy to centrally plan urbanisation and the growth of its industrial sector from a 
low base, the Soviet Union never managed to take the requisite next step towards entrepreneurship and 
services-led growth. To do so would have necessitated abandoning much of what had worked for it in 
previous decades, allowing market forces and the incentives they create to respond to the tastes of 
consumers rather than that of the nomenklatura. This is the position that China faces today and has done 
since its double digit growth dipped in 2009, impacting on both its domestic economy and on global growth.  
We raise this point because, while they are incredibly different economies, there are similarities between 
the choices the leadership of the Soviet Union faced and those that China faces today. While China 
already has far more 'capitalism' than the Soviets ever did – one need look no further than the likes of e-
commerce giant Alibaba, which today has 423m annual active buyers and 410m monthly active mobile 
users – the unpredictable, chaotic nature of market-led growth is causing the Chinese leadership to 
increasingly veer left with regards to economic policy. In that respect, China had pre-2009 – and still has – 
a choice as to whether or not to take the “old road” (centralised, industrial-led growth) or the “new road” 
(decentralised, market-led growth). One cannot hope to understand China today unless one appreciates 
from whence it has come and the political forces at work in China today. 
Falling back to the old ways? 
As the Soviet Union approached its end, its budget deficits ballooned and the money supply grew rapidly, 
leading to price inflation of above 50% a month. However, this experience was not unique: throughout 
history regimes have resorted to the printing press to delay the inevitable and hold on to power for just  
that little bit longer. And China is no different.  For the past 30 years it has relied on a combination of 
liberalisation along with a centrally planned industrial sector, combined w with a relatively lax monetary 
regime.  
In the context of rapid urbanisation and industrial development, central planning and ample credit were 
able to be tolerated. Indeed, China's entire growth model was dependent upon the rapid expansion of 
credit. But while that works well for an economy playing 'catch-up', eventually the easy investments dry up 
and the returns to that ever-expanding credit fail to materialise. Thus the problem today is that the low 
hanging fruits of urbanisation and industrial development have been picked, with the old model of catch-up 
and easy money no longer providing the same impetus to growth as it once did. Figure 1 shows the year-
on-year growth in Chinese credit to the government, corporates and household sector alongside GDP 
                                                        
1Arthur Kroeber (2016), China's Economy: What Everyone Needs to Know, p. 71 
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growth for both the secondary (e.g., industrial and manufacturing) and tertiary (e.g., services) sectors from 
2003 to today.  
 
Figure 1: China credit growth by sector, % YoY, 2q 2002 – 1q 2016  
 
 
Source:  NBS  
 
While the 2009 stimulus, lauded by Keynesian and Monetarist pundits in the West as a stroke of genius, 
was a standout given that it restored China to pre-crisis levels of growth, it ultimately contained the seeds 
of its own destruction. Monetary stimuli can only ever work for a limited period of time. They work by 
fooling actors in an economy, both at home and abroad, into believing that there is far more available 
capital than actually exists. Activity booms and people invest believing that the effect is permanent when in 
reality there is not enough capital to go round. The party must eventually end and when it does we wind up 
with an excess in whatever sectors were stimulated during that particular boom - in China’s case industrial 
productive capacity (this was as true pre-2009 as it is post-2009 – it just got far worse).  
In the past such monetary mistakes were not an issue because China could just grow into any investment 
it made and turn a profit. Yes, productivity was not as high as it could have been, but it was good enough 
given China’s place on the ladder of economic development - and given from where it had come. However, 
by 2008 that growth model was already being tested to its limit and China's leadership, having nothing else 
in their play-book, could not resist falling back on the old ways. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the after-
effects of the 2009 stimulus, not just in China but in those countries whose manufacturing products are 
heavily exposed to Chinese demand: Australia, Germany and Brazil.  
What Austrian economists call a ‘malinvestment boom’ started well before 2009; indeed, the recession that 
China and her ‘vassal’ states faced at the time was not due to some random event but the revelation of 
prior mistakes. But 2009 is important because the actions of the Chinese government served to 
accentuate those mistakes – misallocations of capital, both human and physical – and worse, caused 
investment to flood into projects that were even less viable than those made prior to 2008. 
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Figure 2: China industrial value added, %YoY, Jan 2001 – Apr 2016 
 
Source: Haver Analytics, Asianomics Group  
 
Figure 3: Australia, Brazil, Germany merchandise exports to China, %YoY, 1q 2001 – 1q 2016 
 
Source: Haver Analytics, Asianomics Group  
 
Now China was not entirely at fault – the case on the Mainland is completely different to, say, the U.S. 
sub-prime catastrophe. Indeed, the U.S. can share some blame for the malaise in China too: the zero 
interest rate policy in the world's largest market for capital artificially reduced the cost of capital on global 
wholesale markets. It thus contributed in no small part in both growing as well as extending the duration of 
the boom beyond what it otherwise would have been. But the point is that the boom was always fleeting 
and the stimulus China enacted in 2009 was never going to provide the nation with a permanently higher 
growth plateau.  
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To the contrary, rather than restructure its economy in the face of a recession – remember, a recession is 
nothing more than a reflection of prior errors – the Communist Party of China (CPC) decided to fight reality 
so that it could continue to meet its growth targets. Much like the modern central banker faced with sub-2 
to 3% consumer price inflation (or whatever arbitrary level any particular Central Bank targets), failure to 
achieve its growth target was deemed too great a risk. And so down the old road it marched. 
The case study of 2009 is important today in that the CPC, with different leaders at the helm today, again 
faces a similar choice and similar political forces. Figure 4 shows that the Chinese economy is no longer 
growing anywhere near the rate it once was and a continuation of this trend would result in the government 
missing its long-term targets. 
 
Figure 4: China real GDP, %YoY, 1q 2001 – 1q 2016 
 
Source: Haver Analytics and Asianomics Group 
What about services? 
There is no denying that China has a flourishing services sector with many world-leading performers. But 
what really makes an economy tick as it moves towards having the tertiary sector become the largest 
component of growth, is competition at the margin. Free entry and exit, not dependent upon whom a 
business might know in the CPC or whether or not it can afford enough lawyers to navigate an industry's 
regulations, but rather the ability to test a new idea and have it succeed or fail on its merits. 
China has improved immensely in that area over the past few decades. According to official data (so take 
this with a pinch of salt) there are now over 10,000 businesses created every day in China – seven every 
minute, with half of those listed as "internet companies" 2. The State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce says that today there are some 73 million private enterprises and family businesses in China, 
and these without question represent the future source of growth3. Not all of them will succeed but that is 
the point: trial and error and ultimately Schumpeter's "creative destruction" are how economies transition to 
                                                        
2China's startup boom: 7 new firms every minute, China.org.cn, 9 June 2015 
3China's Business Feels the String of the Party, Bloomberg, 05 May 2016 
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high wealth societies. Older, inefficient industries are left by the wayside – which can create immense 
social pressure within an economy that is used to it (e.g., look at all the pushback against Uber), let alone 
one that has only recently been exposed to such forces – as new sectors which more ably meet consumer 
demand begin to thrive. 
 
Figure 5: China services as a % of total GDP, 1q 2006 – 1q 2016 
 
Source: Haver Analytics and Asianomics Group 
 
Figure 6: Financial intermediation as % of tertiary sector’s GDP contribution, 2q 2012 – 1q 2016 
 
Source: Haver Analytics and Asianomics Group 
But the fundamental question for China is: can its new sectors grow fast enough to offset the massive 
malinvestment and necessary contraction in its primary and secondary sectors? We believe that the 
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answer to this question is a resounding NO, if the rates of growth that the government is forecasting is 
what it truly expects to achieve i.e., 6.5% real GDP growth over the next five years. The growth in the 
services sector will offset the decline in the traditional, heavy industry sectors but if industry is in 
contraction (which it is at the moment) then services will, at best, bring total GDP growth up to the 3-4% 
range in the coming years. Indeed, China's services sector is now responsible for much more growth than 
has ever been the case in China's past, and today it makes up more than half of total GDP (Figure 5).  
However some risks begin to appear when you start to break down the aggregate data. While services are 
growing, financial intermediation accounts for nearly 20% of China's total tertiary sector and has been 
responsible for more than 20% of its total growth since 2012, reaching heights of just under 35% in 2015 
(see Figure 6).  
That is an issue, for much of that growth has come from a rapid rise in debt and, more problematically, 
much of that was funnelled into the very sectors that are now waning (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: China’s credit channels, 2q 2012 – 1q 2016  
 
Source: Haver Analytics and Asianomics Group  
While that officially changed in 2014 (Figure 8), when growth in services and small enterprise loans 
outstripped that of the “old” sectors, it does not change the fact that trillions of renminbi worth of loans 
were issued to hopelessly inefficient businesses and the ability of such borrowers to repay the principal is 
questionable at best. 
Nor does it change the fact that, in volume terms, large industrial enterprises (mostly State-Owned 
Enterprises or SOEs) are still absorbing much of the new credit being issued, despite being part of the “old” 
economy. Beijing is thus left in a bit of a tangle – it wants to liberalise further (including the renminbi) and 
allow its new growth sectors to thrive but in doing so it would expose the old growth sectors to, well, a far 
more rapid demise. That would leave its banks extremely exposed to a rush of bad debts and ultimately a 
crisis. So its policy is to take baby steps, weeding out corruption where it can and reforming inefficient 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
M
ar-12
Jun-12
S
ep-12
D
ec-12
M
ar-13
Jun-13
S
ep-13
D
ec-13
M
ar-14
Jun-14
S
ep-14
D
ec-14
M
ar-15
Jun-15
S
ep-15
D
ec-15
M
ar-16
China industrial and rural loans
China services loans and small enterprise loans
RMB trn 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 40(1)  Economic perspectives 
 
June 2016            55 
 
sectors at the margin, while providing enough credit to keep the biggest problems at bay. That is quite 
simply not an environment in which 6%+ real growth can be expected to take place. 
 
Figure 8: China loan growth by sector, 3q 2012 – 1q 2016 
 
Source: Haver Analytics and Asianomics Group 
 
Figure 9: China investment by sector, %YoY, 1q 2013 – 1q 2016 
 
Source: Haver Analytics and Asianomics Group  
But even without the problems in the financial sector there is still one other rather significant issue with the 
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Secondary and Tertiary sectors side by side and of the three it is actually services which is showing the 
weakest growth.  
When we disaggregate the services sector we find other potential concerns, too. Investment in electronic 
and computer equipment – an essential ingredient for the supposed 5,000 new “internet companies” 
registered each day – is beginning to slow both in the country as a whole but also in urban areas where, if 
the rebalancing story was true, you might expect investment growth to be accelerating (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10: China private investment in computer equipment, %YoY, April 2014 – April 2016 
 
Source: Haver Analytics and Asianomics Group  
 
 ‘The hills are high and the emperor is far away’ 4 
Where does all of that leave the services sector and growth in China? Other than the data and the sheer 
volume of “old” activity that the services sector would need to replace, we have one other major issue with 
the ‘rebalancing’ narrative: that the government is pushing back on what it does not fully understand, 
potentially stifling future growth. On April 8, 2016, the party's periodical, Red Flag Manuscript, wrote the 
following: 
"Some businesspeople in the nonstate economy, especially some entrepreneurs, are having errors in their 
thinking... [They] lack faith in Marxism, socialism, and communism [and think] China under capitalism 
would be better". 
That passage came after a number of senior leaders had expressed similar concerns and were joined by 
government newspapers such as the China Daily, which ran stories about its "concerns" over the growing 
role of the private sector in China’s economy. Some of it is valid: there is a very good reason why 
                                                        
4
 This traditional Chinese saying alludes to local officials’ tendency to disregard the wishes of central authorities in 
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President Xi has, for the past few years, embarked on a general crackdown on corruption, in particular 
corrupt officials. When China allowed bits and pieces of capitalism through the gates it also invited its 
many bureaucrats across many levels of government to turn it into crony-capitalism.  
In just one example of officials dragging their feet, in April 2016 reports circulated that the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce – the bureaucracy that oversees businesses, including those in 
the services sector – had "failed to issue any certificates since August [2015] because it had run out of 
paper"5.  Why, exactly, we do not know but the cynic might surmise that members of that bureaucracy 
were holding out for a bigger cut of the pie. Examples such as these are littered across China and the CPC 
has had a difficult time controlling its public "servants". 
But corruption aside, the fact that the leadership is openly expressing doubts about the pace of 
liberalisation and the eagerness with which the Chinese people are embracing it, is a cause for concern. It 
would not take much for Beijing to deter investment in the more "capitalist" sectors such as information 
technology by making examples out of a few of the more enterprising businesses in its economy. While we 
do not expect the CPC to go down that road given that the general liberalisation regime has served to 
enrich its members as much as anyone else, it will continue to make examples of those individuals which 
bring it unwanted attention. 
Two Chinas 
 
Figure 11: The incidence of strikes in China, 1q 2012 – 1q 2016 
 
 
Source: China Labour Bulletin 
It is true that the services transition is alive in China, in particular in the large, wealthy cities along the 
Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta and Beijing itself. In Shanghai alone, one in six residents is 
                                                        
5Pen-pushers and paper tigers: China’s bureaucrats are still good at getting their way, South China Morning Post, 17 
April 2015 
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supposedly an owner of a start-up, having embraced the new economy with open arms6. But China's 
problems have never been located in these areas. No, the real problem confronting China today lies in its 
regional, industrialised cities. Jobs in those areas are not based on entrepreneurs but on SOEs and are 
concentrated in "old" businesses such as steel milling and manufacturing. While the official unemployment 
data show that nothing is wrong, Figure 11 tells a different story. The number of strikes from disgruntled or 
unemployed workers continues to rise, with the vast majority occurring in regions with large concentrations 
of the “old” growth.  
There is no denying that China has, at the margin, made efforts to reform its SOE sector. For example, on 
18 May 2016, the CPC released a statement following a State Council executive meeting claiming that7: 
“The core business of centrally-owned SOEs is not good enough. Low efficiency and excessive human 
resources, especially in management teams, still plague those companies.” 
Apparently the CPC has asked SOEs to “cut redundant management by around 20 percent within three 
years” and to begin using a more “market-based approach” for hiring and firing decisions. The fact that 
SOEs are still not using a “market-based approach” for such decisions says it all – and labour 
management is surely not the exception here. These businesses are a drag on growth of which the CPC is 
well aware. But for all of its talk, how much it can actually accomplish when there are a myriad of vested 
interests blocking the way of reform? Thus there still remains two Chinas, with the old China absorbing the 
majority of new credit, using it to roll over bad debts, pay its workforce and meet operational costs. The 
principal will likely never be repaid in full as China has reached full capacity and neither the new China nor 
the rest of the world has a need for the entirety of old China’s produce. 
So, what lies ahead? 
China is not going to re-assume the baton of global growth anytime soon. It will continue to grow but it has 
a long, long way to go if it is to catch up to the living standards that even less fortunate Western 
economies enjoy. Per capita GDP is only just above 20% of the U.S. and real GDP per hour worked is 
about 11%, no doubt dragged down by the hugely inefficient SOE sector. Double-digit GDP growth as a 
result of catch-up in its industrial sector has worked well over the past 30 years but only services sector 
growth and the boost in efficiency gains from a move away from large-scale, centrally-planned activity, will 
see it continue to move up the global wealth ladder. The CPC is talking the talk – albeit with some more 
disturbing exceptions – but to all intents and purposes it has yet to fully walk the walk. 
In the short term, the government is faced with the issue of labour unrest as a huge number of workers 
continues to migrate away from the old parts of the economy. Those 20% of redundant SOE management 
(the real figure is far, far larger) will not transition seamlessly into the “new” economy. Their primary skillset 
of making friends, obeying rules and siphoning off just enough from the kitty to go unnoticed is not needed 
in a small enterprise, service based economy.  
Indeed, the misallocations today are so severe and have gone on for so long that many will be unable to 
transition at all and so the government will have to keep otherwise insolvent businesses afloat to prevent 
large-scale labour unrest. But the trade-off is a continuing low productivity drag on a services sector that 
                                                        
6
 China's startup boom: 7 new firms every minute, China.org.cn, 9 June 2015 
7
 China vows to make major state-owned enterprises more competitive, Xinhua, 18 May 2016 
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not only has to grow but grow sufficiently strongly to offset the deadening effect of the multitude of 
inefficient, loss-making businesses in China’s old economy. 
 
Figure 12: Total social financing and RGDP, annual RMB change, q1 2010 – 2016  
 
Source: Haver Analytics and Asianomics Group 
To achieve this end the government needs to keep the credit spigots on the loose side, even if it serves no 
other purpose than to keep bad debts rolling over. It is therefore very unlikely that any expansion of credit 
will have a meaningful, stimulatory impact on the Chinese economy given the lack of investment 
opportunities for the vehicles that are still doing the bulk of the borrowing (SOEs). As Figure 12 shows, 
credit’s influence on real GDP growth has been in decline for some time and it will not improve until the 
inefficient SOE sector shrinks significantly.  
The fact that credit is not translating into GDP growth anymore is not due to a want of it or “tight money” 
but due to poor allocative efficiency. That is, China is creating plenty of debt but it is not going to 
entrepreneurs with good ideas but to managers of SOEs who use it to stay in business and meet their 
payroll. President Xi’s crackdown on corruption is a move in the right direction, along with the CPC’s desire 
to improve the efficiency of SOEs. But the only way to truly improve the efficiency of SOEs is for them to 
drop the “S” and not only privatise but - and this is even more important - open up the sectors in which 
they operate to private sector competition. Until that happens the “old” sectors, no matter how efficient the 
government tries to make them become, will still serve as a net drag on Chinese growth. 
Where stands china in the business cycle? 
At Asianomics we assess the business cycle position of countries in Asia according to a series of what we 
Call “Austrian Stress Indicators”. These indicators are split into two – five domestic economy indicators and 
two external signals. The scores – which are assessed as positive, negative or neutral – on the domestic 
indicators in particular form the basis for placing each country in our business cycle assessment. From a 
macro perspective China scores a -4 (the possible range is +5 to -5) on our domestic business cycle 
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indicators. It is positioned firmly in the “bust” phase of the cycle and that is where we expect it to remain for 
the next few years (Figure 13 and Figure 14). 
 
Figure 13: Austrian stress assessment for Asian economies (May 2016)
 
Source: Asianomics Group 
 
Figure 14: China in the business cycle, may 2016 
 
Source: Asianomics Group  
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One of the key reasons why China will remain in the ‘bust’ phase, other than the malinvestment created 
during the “boom” years, is that debt to GDP is on the high side and is still running above the long-term 
trend (Figure 15) yet this is not translating into new growth given its non-market allocation. 
 
China bank credit relative to GDP growth, 1Q 2000 – 1Q 2016  Figure 15: 
 
Source: Asianomics Group 
 
 Total M2 to reserves (1q 2000 – 1q 2016)Figure 16:  
 
Source: Haver Analytics and Asianomics Group 
The credit allocation problem is one of the reasons for the conundrum that China faces in its desire to have 
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financial services sector as the Chinese move their capital offshore, reducing the credit available to SOEs 
and slowing services sector growth (of which financial services is a major component). As Figure 16 
makes clear, its M2 to reserves ratio, our preferred proxy for the risks of capital flight and a currency crisis, 
continues to rise every month.  
China is generally considered to have large amounts of international reserves and, in absolute terms, this 
is true. However, relative to the size of China’s money supply, its reserve assets are quite small. If 10% of 
the money supply were to exit in a capital flight frenzy (not at all unusual in emerging markets), China’s 
reserves would drop dramatically – by about two-thirds – in short order. That is why capital controls will not 
be relaxed any time soon. 
 
China broad nominal effective exchange rate (May 15 – April 16) Figure 17: 
 
Source: Haver Analytics and Asianomics Group 
Currency crises in emerging markets are only caused when domestic actors lose faith in the domestic 
economy and the way it is being managed. Moreover, policy decisions that are poorly understood, a very 
real risk in China IF it floats the renminbi, can add to the tensions. But even without floating the currency, 
China is limited by how much it can devalue without imposing new capital controls on a regular basis as 
the Chinese people figure out new ways to get around them. While a one-off devaluation the renminbi of 
up to 10% followed by a commitment to maintain a Singapore-style managed exchange rate might have 
taken the heat out of things earlier this year, the People’s Bank of China appears content with its current, 
somewhat uncertain policy. While that has worked out so far in 2016 thanks to a weaker US dollar – and 
Figure 17 shows that the renminbi has softened against a trade-weighted basket of currencies – if that 
trend reverses then it will be forced to act to strengthen capital controls.  
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Conclusions 
While recent data have shown a slight revival in the “old” China – industrial profits, for instance, rose 7.4% 
YoY in 1Q2016 – this will only be fleeting. The malinvestment in the economy, which existed prior to 2009, 
was only accentuated in the worst possible way following a mammoth monetary and fiscal stimulus. Today 
there are two Chinas with two very different forces at work: one a drag on growth as the other seeks to 
boost it. While the “old” China will continue to absorb most of the new credit and linger in the economy like 
a bad smell, existing only so as to prevent civil disruption that would derail the entire economy, the “new” 
economy and its entrepreneurs will carry the baton of progress in the coming years. We expect 3–4% real 
growth, at most, for the next several years as the “old” slowly falls into insignificance, with its debts 
eventually washed away by growth in the “new” China. 
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Fast-growth companies in Scotland  
 
Paul Hopkins and Kenny Richmond, Scottish Enterprise1 
 
 
x Only a small proportion of companies achieve fast-growth, but fast-growth companies account for 
a disproportionate level of turnover and employment growth in the economy. There were 132 fast-
growth companies in Scotland in 2014 (based on the definition used for this research) with a 
combined turnover that increased from £570m in 2011 to £2bn in 2014 - a growth rate of 266%.  
Scotland produces fast-growth companies from its business base at the same rate as most other 
UK regions.   
x The largest fast-growth companies in Scotland (and the UK) tend to be involved in low 
productivity activities, with jobs that are likely to be low skilled and low paid. The majority of 
employment in fast-growth companies (and employment growth) is in companies with productivity 
below the total Scottish industry average. 
x This suggests that, overall, fast-growth companies are not making a positive contribution to 
Scotland’s productivity levels or to inclusive growth. 
x Scotland needs more fast-growth companies in higher productivity sectors. Scottish Enterprise’s 
Company Scaling approach will provide evidence of ‘what works’ in helping companies achieve 
fast growth. 
x Low productivity, fast-growth companies tend to be in sectors that are not a policy focus for 
Scotland. New approaches and more evidence will be required to understand factors affecting 
productivity performance, and the productivity potential of companies in these sectors, and how 
their potential can be realised. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Research shows that fast-growth companies contribute disproportionately to jobs growth, and, compared 
to non-fast growth companies, tend to be more innovative, and are more likely to be exporters2. Therefore, 
developing a better understanding of fast-growth companies in Scotland will contribute to our evidence-
base on their contribution to productivity performance. 
 
This paper presents new evidence on fast-growth companies in Scotland. For this analysis, we have 
considered companies in the turnover sizeband of between £5m and £25m, and that have a minimum of 
10 employees. Fast-growth companies are defined as those within this sizeband that achieved turnover 
growth of at least 60% between 2011 and 2014. 
 
                                                        
1
 Scottish Enterprise is Scotland's main economic development agency and a non-departmental public body of the 
Scottish Government. It work with partners in the public and private sectors to identify and exploit the best opportunities 
to deliver a significant, lasting impact on the Scottish economy. 
2
 See for example High Growth Firms and Productivity - Evidence from the United Kingdom - and Moving on from the 
‘Vital 6%’  
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This sizeband was selected as it includes companies that have achieved a level of success (£5m+ 
turnover). Growth of at least 60% over the three year period was selected as this broadly reflects other 
definitions of fast (or high) growth3.   
 
The aim of the paper is to identify the characteristics of fast-growth companies in Scotland; assess their 
contribution to productivity; and highlight the potential implications of the nature of fast-growth companies 
for economic growth in Scotland.  
 
2. Fast-growth companies across the UK 
 
The FAME business database was used for the research. This database has the advantage of allowing the 
identification of individual companies and the nature of their activities. This allows a broad indication of the 
types of jobs that fast-growth companies in Scotland provide4. 
 
In 2014, there were 2,022 fast-growth companies in the UK. They generated 1.2% of the UK’s turnover 
growth over the period 2011 to 2014, despite only accounting for 0.06% of the entire UK business 
population. They accounted for 4.7% of all companies with 10+ employees and turnover of between £5-
£25m.  
 
There were 132 fast-growth companies in Scotland.  Though only 3% of all fast-growth companies in the 
UK, it is the fourth largest regional total. Scotland’s fast-growth companies accounted for 0.07% of all 
Scottish companies, and 5% of companies with turnover of £5-£25m/10+ employees.  
 
The combined turnover of the 132 companies grew from £570m in 2011 to £2bn in 2014 - a growth rate of 
+266% - with employment potentially growing by over 13,0005. FAME data does not allow an assessment 
of the extent to which this growth is ‘new’ activity or employment or displaced from other companies (e.g. 
through acquiring other companies or taking market share). 
 
This suggests that 5% of companies were responsible for 33% of all turnover growth amongst companies 
with turnover of £5-£25m/10+ employees. This highlights the disproportionate contribution that fast-growth 
companies make to the economy.  
 
Almost half (48%) of the UK’s fast-growing companies are located in London and the South East of 
England. Figure 1 shows fast-growth companies as a percentage of all companies with turnover of 
between £5-£25m/10+ employees for UK regions. This indicates that only a small proportion in the size 
band achieve fast growth. Scotland compares favourably to most other regions with nearly 1 in every 20 
                                                        
3
 See for example Tomorrow’s champions: finding the small business engines for economic growth. Additionally, the 
OECD define ‘high growth’ as companies that achieve at least 20% growth a year over three consecutive years. 
Analysis in this paper just considers growth of 60% between 2011 and 2014, not whether a minimum of 20% was 
achieved each year. 
4
 See Appendix 1 for further information on FAME 
5
 Employment growth data is not available through FAME, so this has been estimated based on average turnover per 
employee for each fast growth company. 
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companies achieving fast-growth 6 . This suggests that compared to most UK regions, companies in 
Scotland are slightly more likely to achieve fast-growth. 
 
The high percentage of companies achieving fast-growth in the South East of England is expected, given 
the region’s fast growing and highly dynamic economy. However, perhaps more surprising is the high 
percentage of companies achieving fast-growth in Wales, and the relatively low percentage in London. The 
reasons for this are unclear. 
 
Figure 1: Fast-growth companies as a % of all companies with turnover of £5m+ and employing 10+ staff, 
by UK nation and region, 2014. 
 
Source: FAME 
 
3. Characteristics of fast growth companies in Scotland 
 
Scotland’s fast-growth companies are spread across the country, although 55% are located in Aberdeen, 
Edinburgh and Glasgow7. This suggests that in Scotland fast-growth can be achieved in both cities and 
rural locations8. 
 
The 31 fast-growth companies in Aberdeen and Aberdeenshire are predominantly based in or supporting 
the oil & gas industry. Given the continuing challenges facing the industry, it is likely there are fewer fast-
growth companies in Aberdeen now than for the period used in the research. 
 
The data shows that fast-growth can be achieved across a wide range of sectors, including those that are 
not usually considered to be high technology or knowledge intensive. 
 
The largest numbers of fast-growth companies in Scotland (and the UK) are in financial & business 
services, technology & advanced engineering, wholesale & retail, and construction (together accounting 
for 50% of all fast-growth companies)9.  
                                                        
6
 The data does not allow an international comparison, but this could be considered via future research. 
 
8
 Appendix 2 provides a full breakdown of geographical location 
9
 Due to data confidentiality, names of these companies cannot be provided. 
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The percentage breakdown of fast-growth companies by sector is broadly similar for Scotland and the UK, 
with the main significant difference being wholesale & retail accounting for a higher proportion in the UK, 
and Scotland having a higher proportion in the administration & support, transportation, education and 
energy sectors. 
 
Notably, for two of the Scottish Government’s growth sectors10 (tourism and life sciences) there are no 
fast-growth companies in Scotland - and in the UK as whole, fast-growth companies are very rare in these 
sectors. The reasons for this are not clear.  
 
Figure 2: Fast-growth companies in Scotland and the UK by sector (% of all FGCs). 
 
 
Source: FAME.  
 
Most fast-growth companies in Scotland (and the UK) are in ‘non-tradable’ sectors that are more locally or 
domestically focused in terms of markets (rather than international), although the two largest sectors 
(financial & business services and technology & advanced engineering) are tradable11.  
 
Fast-growth companies in tradable sectors account for a higher proportion of fast-growth company 
employment than turnover than those in tradable sectors - this suggests that productivity in fast-growth 
companies in tradable sectors is higher than those in non-tradable sectors.    
Figure 3 highlights the proportion of companies within each sector that achieve fast growth, providing a 
broad indication of which sectors are more likely to ‘produce’ fast growth companies.  
                                                        
10
 Scottish Government Growth Sectors Database 
11
 Industries have been classified as tradable and non-tradable using a broad OECD methodology that considers levels of imports 
and exports for each sector. See Appendix 3 for a list of sectors.  
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There are a number of differences between the UK and Scotland. Scottish companies are more likely than 
those in the UK to become fast-growth in ten of the 22 sectors, particularly in education, information & 
communications, administration & support services and creative industries.  
 
Conversely, companies in Scotland in construction, aerospace/defence/marine and health & social care 
are less likely to achieve fast growth than those in the UK. If Scotland matched UK performance in the 
sectors in which it currently lags the UK, this would result in 22 more fast-growth companies in Scotland.  
 
Although there is no consistent pattern, the data suggests that non-tradable sectors may be slightly more 
likely to produce fast-growth companies than tradable sectors. 
 
Figure 3: Fast-growth companies as a percentage of all companies with 10+ employees and turnover of 
£5-£25m, by sector 
 
Source: FAME.   
 
4. Productivity  
 
Productivity is usually defined as gross value add (or GVA)12 per employee or hour worked. However, this 
data is not available in FAME, so turnover per employee is used as a proxy productivity measure in the 
analysis below13. For the largest eight sectors for fast-growth companies, productivity is very similar in 
Scotland and the UK as a whole. 
 
Considering productivity in individual fast-growth companies, there is a large spread ranging from almost 
£1m turnover per employee to under £60,000. Companies with the highest levels of turnover per employee 
are from a range of sectors, including wholesale/retail, financial & business services, construction, energy 
and manufacturing.  
 
                                                        
12
 GVA at a company level is defined as employee costs + profits + depreciation 
13
 Turnover per employee is a good proxy for GVA per employee. Companies that have high turnover per employee also 
tend to have high GVA per employee – although there are exceptions for a small number of sectors including wholesale 
and retail. 
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Figure 4: Productivity (turnover per employee) of fast-growth companies, by most common sectors,  
   Scotland and UK, 2014 
 
 
Source: FAME.   
 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of Scotland’s fast-growth companies by productivity and employment size. 
This suggests that fast-growth companies with the highest productivity are small in terms of employment, 
and the largest fast-growth companies in Scotland tend to be low productivity, and account for a significant 
proportion of fast-growth company employment. This is also the case across all regions of the UK. 
 
Overall, 67% of fast-growth companies have productivity above the all company average across 
Scotland14, however, they account for only 32% of fast growth company jobs. Therefore, 68% of jobs in 
fast-growth companies have productivity levels below the Scottish average. This suggests that fast growth 
companies overall are not making a contribution to increasing Scotland’s productivity performance15.  
 
Fast-growth companies with the largest employment and the lowest productivity tend to be involved in low 
productivity activities, such as catering, care services, security, leisure services, facilities management and 
business process outsourcing. In these sectors job quality and wage rates are likely to be low. The 20 fast-
growth companies with the lowest productivity (all below the overall Scottish average) are estimated to 
have accounted for 55% of employment growth of all fast-growth companies16. 
 
The finding that fast growth companies tend to have low levels of productivity has been reflected in other 
research17.  
 
 
                                                        
14
 Based on average turnover per worker in Scottish Annual Business Statistics 
15
 It may be the case that a number of fast growth companies are experiencing higher than average productivity growth, 
however FAME data does not allow this to be measured. 
16
 Due to data confidentiality, names of these companies cannot be provided. 
17
 High-Growth Firms: Stylized Facts and Conflicting Results  
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Figure 5: Distribution of Scotland’s fast-growth companies by turnover per employee and employment 
size, 2014. 
Source: FAME. Note: Excludes top 4 companies with £1m+ turnover per employee. Also excluded are 14 where 
productivity is unavailable.  
 
 
5.  Policy implications  
 
The key findings from this analysis are: 
 
x Fast-growth companies account for a disproportionate level of turnover and employment growth 
in the Scottish economy, but they are small in number.  
x Overall, Scotland is just as good at producing fast-growth companies from its business base as 
most other UK regions (although for a number of sectors that are a focus for Scotland, there were 
no fast-growth companies over the 2011-2014 period). 
x The largest fast-growth companies in Scotland tend to be involved in low productivity activities, 
with jobs that are likely to be low skilled and low paid (similar to the UK as a whole). The 
productivity of the majority of employment in fast-growth companies is below the total Scottish 
industry average. 
x Overall fast-growth companies are not making a positive contribution to increasing Scotland’s 
productivity levels (in terms of turnover per employee) and therefore to inclusive growth. 
 
These findings raise two key policy issues: 
 
(i) How to create more and larger fast-growth companies in higher productivity sectors in Scotland, 
including in life sciences, chemical sciences and aerospace/defence/marine (ADM)? 
 
Scottish Enterprise’s ‘company scaling’ approach, which aims to support around 100 companies by 2018, 
should help to increase the number of fast-growth companies in Scotland. Given the focus of SE support is 
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to generally support higher productive sectors, this should help increase the number of higher quality and 
better paid jobs in Scotland. 
 
(ii) How to increase productivity in low productivity companies and sectors? 
 
The data suggests that many of the largest fast-growth companies are involved in low productivity / low 
pay activities such as security, recruitment, leisure and care. Companies in these sectors account for and 
create a significant number of jobs. A number of these sectors are forecast to expand significantly over the 
next decade, particularly the care sector.  
 
A key consideration is the extent to which the productive potential of such companies can be raised, and 
the role policy can play in both raising their productivity potential and helping them achieve it.  
 
Further research will be required to better understand the productivity challenges and potential for 
companies in these sectors, including identifying overseas examples of good practice (for example, the 
approaches taken by a care providers in the Netherlands to significantly increase performance, job 
satisfaction and productivity18).  
 
A number of the sectors in which we find fast growth companies are outwith the usual sector policy focus 
in Scotland. This raises questions as to the best routes to identify productivity challenges and solutions 
and, the respective roles of partners in both the public (Scottish Government, Enterprise Agencies, Local 
Authorities and Business Gateway) and the private sectors (industry / sector bodies, Chambers of 
Commerce, FSB etc.). 
 
Appendix 1: The FAME database 
 
FAME is a business database drawn primarily from Companies House, of companies in the UK and 
Ireland. It provides company profiles including subsidiaries and directors, accounting and financial 
information, shareholder details and latest company news. Companies are traceable to postcode level, 
and are assigned to regions based on a variety of criteria including company HQ and base location. 
 
FAME provides a useful source for analysis, enabling a comparison of Scotland’s performance with other 
regions in the UK, but there are challenges with using it. For example, smaller subsidiary companies can 
have financial data listed which refers to their larger, parent company, and employment data can vary on 
whether companies include all employees such as temporary and agency workers are included. As far as 
possible, these anomalies have been cleansed from this research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
18
 Buurtzorg: better care for lower cost 
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Appendix 2: Location of Scotland’s fast-growth companies by Local Authority area 
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Appendix 3: Categorisation of ‘Tradeable’ and ‘non-Tradeable’ sectors 
 
Non-Tradable Tradable 
Administration and support services  ADM  
Education  Chemical sciences  
Health and social care Energy 
Information and communication Financial and business services 
Construction  Food and drink 
Creative industries  Forest & timber  
Professional, scientific, technical services Life sciences 
Tourism Other manufacturing[2] 
Real estate TAE 
Transportation Textiles 
Other companies[1]  
Wholesale and retail  
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[2]
 These include packaging companies, rubber manufacturers, manufacturing of imitation jewellery, musical 
instruments, sports goods, games and toys, and protective safety equipment. 
[1]
 These include arts, entertainment and recreation, sports activities, gambling, member organisations 
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‘Scotland’s Budget’: major new event to examine Scotland’s 
Budget options announced by The Fraser of Allander Institute 
(September 2016) 
The Fraser of Allander Institute is delighted to announce a major new event in 
Edinburgh to coincide with publication of the Scottish Government’s Draft 
Budget later in the autumn, the first to be published under the Scottish 
Parliament’s new fiscal powers.   
This new annual event – the first of its kind in Scotland – will bring together 
leading experts in the Fraser of Allander and the business and policy 
communities to discuss the challenges, opportunities and policy responses 
open to the Cabinet Secretary for Finance when preparing the government’s 
tax and spending plans for the next year and beyond.   
Papers supporting the event will be published in a Special Scottish Budget 
Issue of the Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary.   
Issues to be discussed:   
x The Outlook for Scottish Economy  
 
x An Overview of the UK Public Finances and the implications for 
Scotland  
 
x Scotland’s New Fiscal Framework 
 
x The Outlook for the Scottish Budget 
 
x The Choices facing the Cabinet Secretary and the likely impacts of 
alternative policy responses 
 
x Panel Q&A 
 
To register your interest in attending please contact – fraser@strath.ac.uk 
